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This thesis provides an overview of attempts to mitigate climate change through 
emissions trading systems (ETS) with a focus on China’s recent announcement 
to implement a national ETS. The report begins with a description of climate 
change and the inherent difficulties of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. Popular policy mechanisms that aim to reduce GHG emissions with a 
goal of mitigating climate change are described, including the United Nations 
efforts to implement an international ETS through international climate 
negotiations. The second chapter reports on international, national and regional 
ETSs, with a focus on a multitude of critical ETS components. The third chapter 
outlines the theory of linking ETSs, design considerations, benefits, potential 
barriers and risks of linking. The fourth chapter focuses on air pollution in China 
and the state’s response to limit pollution through regional pilot ETSs that may 
transition into a Chinese national ETS based on the pilot programs’ results. The 
conclusion of the thesis focuses on the potential repercussions of the future 
implementation of China’s national ETS. The thesis concludes that China’s 
selection of an ETS over other policy mechanisms can enhance other nations’ 
confidence in an ETS’s ability to reduce emissions without impeding economic 
growth. The Chinese system can influence future UNFCCC meetings and may 
facilitate global agreements. The lessons learned from China’s ETS has the 
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potential to encourage the development of existing and future ETSs. Asia could 
become the global center for emissions trading if China considers linking 
systems with existing and future ETSs. 
 
 
 vi 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................. vii 
List of Figures………………………………………………………………………………….viii 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ............................................................................ ix 
CHAPTER I: CLIMATE CHANGE...................................................................................... 1 
 Reducing GHG Emissions ........................................................................................ 8 
 Emissions Trading Systems (ETS)......................................................................... 13 
 United Nations Efforts to Reduce Greenhouse Gases ........................................... 18 
CHAPTER II: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS .................. 25 
 Existing Emissions Trading Systems...................................................................... 28 
 Emissions Trading System Components................................................................ 49 
CHAPTER III: LINKING EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS ........................................... 59 
 Types of ETS Linkages .......................................................................................... 61 
 ETS Design Considerations and Potential Barriers to Linkages............................. 61 
 Risks of Linking ...................................................................................................... 64 
CHAPTER IV: CHINA ...................................................................................................... 68 
 Air Pollution in China .............................................................................................. 68 
 Chinese ETS - Design ............................................................................................ 74 
 Chinese ETS - Global Effect................................................................................... 86 
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION........................................................................................... 90 
APPENDIX ....................................................................................................................... 94 
REFERENCES................................................................................................................. 99 
 
 
 vii 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Overview of Carbon Pricing Instruments............................................................ 10 
Table 2. Global Overview of ETSs – Definitions .............................................................. 28 
Table 3. Existing Emissions Trading Systems ................................................................. 30 
Table 4. ETS Components - Definitions ........................................................................... 50 
Table 5. Linking ETSs - Definitions .................................................................................. 59 
Table 6. Overview of the Benefits and Risks of Linking ETSs ......................................... 60 
Table 7. Chinese Pilot Program Coverage and Allocation ............................................... 78 
Table 8. Chinese Regional ETS Details ........................................................................... 94 
 
 
 viii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Average Global Temperature Increase Since 1901 ............................................ 2 
Figure 2. Annual and Decadal Average Global Temperature Increase.............................. 4 
Figure 3. Global Temperature and Carbon Dioxide............................................................ 6 
Figure 4. Fundamental Design of an C&T Emissions Trading System ............................ 16 
Figure 5. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Country ........................................................... 22 
Figure 6. ETS Share of Global GHG Emissions............................................................... 27 
Figure 7. EUETS Allowance Price History ....................................................................... 36 
Figure 8. Western Climate Initiative ................................................................................. 45 
Figure 9. Existing and Considered ETSs – Western Hemisphere.................................... 47 
Figure 10. Existing and Considered ETSs – Eastern Hemisphere................................... 48 
Figure 11. Sectoral Coverage of Regional, National, and Subnational ETSs .................. 52 
Figure 12. Price Coupling of New Zealand Credits and International Credits .................. 66 
Figure 13. China’s Energy Consumption By Source ........................................................ 69 
Figure 14. China’s Coal Production and Consumption (in millions of tons) 2000-2011 ... 70 
Figure 15. Daily Average Pollution of Chinese and US Cities .......................................... 72 
Figure 16. Chinese Regional Pilot Emissions Trading Systems ...................................... 77 
Figure 17. Characteristics of the Chinese ETS Pilots in Operation.................................. 83 
    
 
 
 ix 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
AB32  Assembly Bill 32 (California) 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
CER   Certified Emission Reduction 
CO2   Carbon Dioxide 
CO2e  Carbon Dioxide Equivalent 
COP   Conference of the Parties 
CPRS  Carbon Pollution Reduction System (Australia) 
EPA   Environmental Protection Agency (USA) 
ERU   Emission Reduction Units 
ETS   Emissions Trading System 
EUETS  European Union Emissions Trading System 
FYP   Five-Year Plans for National Economic & Social Development 
   (China)  
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GHG  Greenhouse Gas 
Gt   Gigaton (1 billion metric tons)  
IET   International Emissions Trading 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JCM   Joint Crediting Mechanism (Japan) 
JI   Joint Implementation 
KAZ ETS  Kazakhstan ETS 
MEP   Ministry of Environmental Protection (China) 
MRV   Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
NDRC  National Development and Reform Commission (China) 
NZETS  New Zealand Emissions Trading System 
NZU   New Zealand Unit 
RGGI  Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (USA) 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WCI   Western Climate Initiative 
WTO  World Trade Organization
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER I: CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Mitigating climate change caused by the release of greenhouse gases (GHG) 
into the atmosphere has become a political, economic and cultural worldwide 
challenge. As world leaders search for efficient means to reduce GHG emissions, 
they also seek to meet energy demands of growing populations (World Bank, 
2013). Policies that charge users for the release of carbon dioxide (CO2/carbon) 
and other GHGs into the atmosphere are one option to mitigate climate change. 
Emissions trading systems (ETS) have been gaining attention as a policy 
mechanism to potentially reduce GHG emissions at low marginal cost to emitters. 
Various nations are testing domestic emissions trading as an option to reduce 
emissions in accordance with the nation’s economic and political situation. 
Linking these ETSs may have the potential to control enough emissions to 
mitigate climate change dangers. China, with the highest net GHG emissions in 
the world, has announced the goal of implementing a national ETS to measure, 
price and reduce GHG emissions. If implemented, China’s ETS will be the largest 
in the world and may influence emissions trading worldwide. 
GLOBAL TEMPERATURE PATTERNS 
 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), while there 
has been substantial variability in the global surface temperature, almost the 
entire globe has experienced warming temperatures since the year 1901 (IPCC 
AR5 WG1, 2013). Figure 1 illustrates the average global surface temperature 
changes from 1901 to 2012. Figure 1 shows that during this period, multiple 
regions have experienced average surface temperature increases of up to 2.5°C 
while almost no regions have experienced decreases in average surface 
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temperatures. Ocean warming has been the largest near the surface (upper 75m) 
and has warmed by 0.11°C per decade over the period from 1971 to 2010 (IPCC 
AR5 WG1, 2013).  
Figure 1. Average Global Temperature Increase Since 1901 
 
Source: IPCC, (2013): Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2013:   
The Physical Science Basis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New 
York, NY, USA. Retrieved from http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment 
report/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf 
 
 
According to the IPCC, temperatures have been warming at an increasing rate, 
with the warmest 30-year period in the Northern Hemisphere in the last 1400 
years occurring from 1983 to 2012 (IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013). Figure 2 illustrates 
the annual and decadal average global temperature increase since the year 
1850. The figure shows that the decadal average temperature of the years 2000-
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2010 was 0.8°C higher than the period between 1900-1910 (IPCC AR5 WG1, 
2013). The last three decades has been successively warmer than any preceding 
decade since 1850 (IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013).  
 
While there is an overall multi-decadal warming, the global mean surface 
temperature shows substantial decadal and annual variability. Measuring short-
term variations does not generally reflect long-term climate trends (IPCC AR5 
WG1, 2013). As an example, if the rate of warming is measured over 15 years 
from 1998-2012, the rate of warming is 0.05°C per decade. If the rate of warming 
is measured over a longer span of 61 years from 1951-2012, the rate of warming 
is 0.12°C per decade (IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013). The long-term temperature 
increase trends are commonly referred to as “climate change” or “global 
warming.”  
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Figure 2. Annual and Decadal Average Global Temperature Increase 
 
Source: IPCC, (2013): Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2013:   
The Physical Science Basis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New 
York, NY, USA. Retrieved from http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment 
report/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf 
 
Changes to the climate can pose a risk to multiple aspects of natural ecosystems 
and modern human society. Some analysts argue that even modest temperature 
increases of 1.8 - 2°C can have significant natural consequences such as the 
extinction of one-quarter of living species by 2050 (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 
2009). Some analysts argue that the increased variability of seasonal 
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temperatures may cause terrestrial, freshwater and marine animal species 
worldwide to shift their geographical ranges, leading to migration and changes in 
species abundance (IPCC WG2, 2013). Hydrological systems can also be 
affected by changes to the climate that reduce the quantity and quality of water 
resources in rivers and lakes, increasing flood and drought risks (IPCC WG2, 
2013). Altered natural ecosystems can affect human economies, such as the 
volume of available drinking water supply, reduced agricultural yields and 
extreme weather. Less developed nations may face additional risks, such as 
desertification, hunger, human migration or armed conflict over resources (Brohe, 
Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). 
GREENHOUSE GASES 
 
The IPCC has argued that the main cause of a warming climate is the increasing 
amounts of GHGs such as CO2 in the atmosphere (IPCC WG1, 2013). Figure 3 
illustrates how average surface temperature on both land and water vary with a 
rise in atmospheric CO2 levels, indicated as a rising line of parts per million. The 
bars reaching downward represent temperatures below the long-term average 
while the bars reaching upwards represent temperatures above long-term 
averages, as measured from 1880 (Karl, et. al, 2009). Figure 3 shows that while 
there is a trend between the rising CO2 levels and rising average global 
temperature, each year does not show an increase in temperature when 
compared to the previous year. The figure also shows greater changes in 
temperature between some years. Natural processes that affect global changes 
of temperatures and rainfalls such as El Niño and La Niña cause differences in 
yearly temperature increases (Karl, et. al, 2009).   
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Figure 3. Global Temperature and Carbon Dioxide 
 
 
 
Source: NNSA, (2009): Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States. Cambridge 
University Press, Retrieved from 
http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/karl%20et%20al%202009.pdf 
 
Analysts argue that not only is the level of GHGs in the atmosphere today higher 
than it has been in the past 450,000 years (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009), in 
addition every year anthropogenic emissions of GHGs add to this concentration 
at an average rate of 4 parts per million (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009), and the 
rate of anthropogenic GHG emissions has been increasing. From 1970 to 2000, 
anthropogenic GHGs increased on average by 0.4 GtCO2e1,2 (1.3%) per year. 
                                                
1 Gigaton refers to 1 billion metric tons  
2 CO2e refers to CO2 equivalent  
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Over the past decade, anthropogenic emissions increased on average of 1.0 
GtCO2e (2.2%) per year (IPCC WG1, 2013). The last decade was marked by the 
highest total anthropogenic GHG emissions in human history, reaching 49 
GtCO2e in 2010 (IPCC WG1, 2013). According to the World Bank, these 
emissions are expected to climb to 59 GtCO2e by the year 2020 (World Bank, 
2014). The World Bank reported that the world will need to limit GHG emissions 
to 44GtCO2e per year to avoid dangerous levels of climate change (World Bank, 
2014).  
FOSSIL FUELS 
 
A substantial percentage of anthropogenic emissions of GHGs come from the 
combustion of fossil fuels. When energy is released from fossil fuels such as 
coal, oil and natural gas through combustion, CO2 is emitted as a byproduct. 
Fossil fuel related CO2 emissions were about 32 Gt CO2e/yr in 2010 and 
increased another 3 percent in 2011. Between 1970 and 2010 the GHG 
emissions from fossil fuel related CO2 has increased by 108 percent (IPCC, 
2013). Reducing the use of high GHG-emitting fossil fuels is being considered as 
a means to reduce climate change. 
 
Reducing the use of fossil fuels in order to prevent the effects of climate change 
can be viewed as a difficult task because it will cost money, could complicate 
development in poor nations and affect human lifestyles worldwide. Fossil fuels 
are an essential part of modern industrial society; reducing consumption without 
a feasible alternative could lead to economic and social consequences. Fossil 
fuels generate over 66 percent of the world’s electricity. Coal, the highest emitter 
of CO2, accounts for 42 percent of the world’s electricity (World Coal Association, 
2012).  Coal combustion alone was responsible for more than 45 percent of 
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global energy-related CO2 emissions in 2011 (IEA, 2012). The use of fossil fuels 
is expected to continue growing well into the future. Coal is expected to fuel 
1,200 coal-burning power plants that are planned for construction globally over 
the next five years (WRI, 2012).  
 
Reducing GHG Emissions 
CLIMATE CHANGE AS A MARKET FAILURE 
 
Climate change can be viewed as a market failure. GHGs from fossil fuels are 
released into the atmosphere because the use of the energy stored in coal, oil 
and natural gas is an economically valuable activity even though the purchase 
price of fossil fuels does not account for the external damages of climate change. 
When damages caused by global warming are not accounted for, fossil fuels 
continue to be used based off of an incomplete measure of their overall net-value 
to society. If the damages caused by global warming were accounted for and 
economically linked to the use of fossil fuels, alternative sources of energy could 
be more cost effective choices. The emission of GHGs is external to the market 
because there is not an economic incentive to avoid this activity. An externality is 
defined as the consequence of an industrial activity that is not reflected in the 
cost of the goods or services involved (Clark, 2012). The conflict of interests 
between the use of the valuable energy stored in fossil fuels and the goal to 
avoid climate change can be viewed as a market failure. 
 
Even when the risks of climate change are understood, it is unlikely that a 
warming climate can be avoided if the risks and damages of climate change are 
not accounted for and linked within the perceived value of fossil fuel use and the 
subsequent emission of GHGs. The market failure could possibly be corrected 
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through policy mechanisms that tie the price on the emission of GHGs, to 
internalize the risk and cost of future damages caused by climate change to the 
price of fossil fuels (Clark, 2012). 
PRICING CARBON 
 
World Bank studies have argued that pricing the emission of GHGs (also called 
pricing carbon) can be a cost effective technique to limit emissions by utilizing the 
private sector’s economic power through targeted policies, methodologies and 
regulatory frameworks (World Bank, 2013). Many processes that release GHGs 
are core to economic development, such as energy production from fossil fuels. 
Adding a significant expense to fossil fuels will affect the price of all products and 
services that use the energy from fossil fuels (World Bank, 2013).  
 
Designing an efficient price on carbon is not easy because each country, region, 
state and business affected by any plan to reduce emissions would want to 
remain competitive in a global market (World Bank, 2013). If an initial attempt at 
pricing carbon is unsuccessful, policy makers run the risk of strong public 
resistance to similar attempts to price carbon. This situation will add to the 
difficulty of implementing a new system to price carbon (World Bank, 2013).  
 
There are three major tools being used to reduce GHG emissions by pricing 
carbon: policy regulation, taxation, and emissions trading. Each tool affects the 
targeted entities in a different way. Table 1 compares three carbon-pricing tools. 
The table shows each tool’s principle, examples of main applications, strengths 
and weaknesses
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Table 1. Overview of Carbon Pricing Instruments 
 
 
 Policy Regulation Emissions Trading Systems Taxation 
Principle 
-Mandatory laws are created 
that set specific quotas on 
emission amounts 
-Cap-and-trade (C&T) - Covered entities receive a 
quota of emissions. To comply with the quota, the 
entity either reduces its emissions or buys 
additional emission reductions from another 
company directly 
 
-Baseline and credit (B&C) - No cap on overall 
emissions. A baseline is established and 
emissions permits are awarded once covered 
entities reduce emissions under the baseline 
-The polluter pays a fee proportional to its 
emission of pollutants 
Example of 
Main 
Application 
-Limits set on nitrogen oxide 
(NOx) and sulfur oxide (SOx) 
emissions from power plants. 
-Kyoto Protocol (C&T+B&C) 
 
-EU ETS (EU) (C&T) 
 
-RGGI (US) (C&T) 
-Tax per ton of GHG released 
 
-Fuel taxes (indirect) 
 
-Registration fees for cars based on engine 
size (indirect) 
 
-Proposed tariffs on high-carbon goods 
(indirect) 
 
 
Strengths 
- Relatively Simple 
 
-Can have low transaction 
costs 
 
-Can be most appropriate 
where there are high 
damages from pollution 
-Can encourage innovation and investment in new 
abatement technologies 
 
-Emissions cap provides an attractive political 
signal 
 
-Cap focuses on achieving a specific quantity of 
abatement 
 
-Can encourage innovation and investment 
in new abatement technologies 
 
-Creates a flow of revenue for government 
that can be used to lower other taxes  
 
-Arguably less open to political lobbying 
than direct regulation 
Source: Brohe, A., Eyre, N., Howarth, N. (2009). Carbon Markets: An International Business Guide. London, England: Earthscan
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Table 1. (Continued) Overview of Carbon Pricing Instruments 
 
Strengths 
(continued) 
-Transparent 
-Can be easy to implement 
 
-Creates a moral signal about 
pollution 
 
-Does not involve operating 
through behavioral responses 
to price signals 
 
-Auctioning permits under cap-and-trade can raise 
revenue for governments 
 
-Cap and trade in principle could achieve least 
cost emission reductions 
-Engages the banking and finance sector in 
abatement innovation 
 
-Can be used as a tool to combat global inequity 
 
-Carbon pricing is hidden behind CO2 cap, 
increasing political acceptability 
-Keeps investment in low-carbon solutions 
local 
 
-Sets a clear carbon price that investors 
can use to plan with greater certainty 
 
-Low transaction costs if integrated into 
existing tax systems 
Weaknesses 
- Provides little if any 
incentive to reduce pollution 
beyond the limits 
 
-Can slow technological 
innovation 
 
-Abatement is unlikely to be 
achieved in a least cost 
manner 
-Open to political lobbying (e.g. limited auctioning 
and preference to existing firms vs. new entrants) 
 
-Information requirements are initially high to set a 
cap for each firm 
 
-Resources for abatement can be dispersed  
geographically 
 
-Can introduce uncertainty over price, therefore 
undermines long-term investment planning 
 
-High transaction costs 
 
-Baseline and credit systems can lack 
environmental effectiveness 
 
-Behavior not always sensitive to price signal 
-Politically difficult to bring in as adverse 
equity effects on citizens are transparent 
 
-Difficult to control the quantity of pollution 
with a price instrument under uncertainty 
 
-Behavior is not always sensitive to price 
signals 
 
Source: Brohe, A., Eyre, N., Howarth, N. (2009). Carbon Markets: An International Business Guide. London, England: Earthscan
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. 
Policy regulation refers to policy set in place that regulates emissions, limiting 
discharge under state-imposed punishments, such as state-imposed limits on 
GHG emissions for power plants or industrial plants. This technique can be 
implemented in societies with strong judicial and administrative systems. Policy 
regulation can create a signal about pollution and does not involve operating 
through behavioral responses to price signals (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009).  
One weakness of this technique is that GHG abatement may not be achieved in 
a least cost manner if the regulations specify what technologies need to be used 
to reduce emissions. Regulations also provide little incentive to reduce emissions 
further than what is necessary to comply with the law (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 
2009).  
A carbon tax is a price on CO2 or a price per ton of CO2e (World Bank, 2014).  A 
government could charge an emitter a tax directly on GHG emissions or indirectly 
such as through a tax on high GHG fuels, registration fees for cars based on 
engine size or tariffs on high-carbon goods (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). 
Taxes can be dynamically efficient by encouraging innovation and investment in 
new abatement technologies, while also creating a flow of revenue that could be 
dedicated to lower other taxes (known as a double dividend). Transaction costs 
of implementing a tax can be low if the taxes are integrated into existing tax 
systems (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). However, in many societies a new tax 
can be difficult to initiate politically, as a tax could result in adverse equity effects 
on poor citizens (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). A carbon tax can guarantee the 
price of emissions in an economic system but emission reductions are not 
guaranteed. 
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Carbon taxes can include flexibility measures to encourage emissions reductions 
(Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). For example, Denmark's exempts entities that 
voluntarily agree to improve energy efficiency. Switzerland's carbon tax has 
exemptions for entities that agree to an overall emission reduction target. A tax 
can be introduced alongside another carbon pricing instrument such as an ETS 
in order to cover emissions that could not be included under another instrument 
(World Bank, 2014). Taxes can also include specific elements from ETSs by 
allowing the use of offsets to help meet reduction targets. South Africa and 
Mexico both allow covered entities to use emissions credits to achieve the 
reduction goals set up under their carbon tax (World Bank, 2014). 
 
British Columbia, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK all have some type of active carbon 
tax. In total, existing carbon taxes cover about 6 GtCO2e or about 12 percent of 
the annual global GHG emissions (World Bank, 2014). South Africa, Brazil, Chile, 
Oregon and Korea are also examining the economic impacts involved in 
implementing a tax on GHG reductions (World Bank, 2014). 
 
Emissions Trading Systems (ETS) 
   
Emissions Trading Systems are financial incentives to reduce emissions cost 
effectively. Businesses or organizations can buy or be issued permits (also called 
credits or allowances) for the emissions they release over a set amount of time. 
Emissions released by the covered entities must be accounted for with these 
permits.  
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To reduce GHG emissions, permits may be issued equal to one metric ton of CO2 
or CO2e based on the released gas’s global warming potential (GWP). The US 
Environmental Protection Agency has defined the GWP of a GHG as “The ratio of 
the time-integrated radiative forcing from the instantaneous release of 1 kilogram 
(kg) of a trace substance relative to that of 1 kg of a reference gas. The reference 
gas used is CO2” (EPA, 2013). Other GHGs can have higher GWP than CO2. For 
example, CH4 (methane) has a GWP of 25 tons of CO2.  
 
Under an ETS, covered entities are required to surrender permits equal to the 
GWP of the gasses emitted. If one ton of CO2 is released into the atmosphere, 
the emitter will have to surrender one carbon permit to cover the emission. If one 
ton of a gas with a higher GWP such as CH4 (Methane) is released into the 
atmosphere, the emitter would have to surrender 25 permits to match the GWP 
of CH4.  
 
ETSs generally come in two forms: “Cap and Trade” (C&T) or “Baseline and 
Credit” (B&C). A B&C ETS is designed with no overall cap on emissions. A 
baseline of emissions is established and emissions credits or allowances are 
earned that can be sold once a participant reduces emissions under the baseline. 
A C&T ETS is designed with a controlled limit or “cap” on the amount of 
emissions covered entities are allowed to emit. The cap or quota is usually set 
based on the necessary reductions of emissions in the atmosphere to reach 
target levels. To comply with the cap, the covered entity will either reduce 
emissions locally or pay for additional reductions to be made at another location 
(Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). Under a C&T system, there can be a continuous 
reduction of finite permits. Increasing scarcity of permits encourage covered 
entities to reduce emissions in anticipation of receiving fewer permits during the 
next phase of the ETS. The set limit on the permits creates a value, as prices 
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would be driven up each trading period when the overall supply of permits 
continuously is reduced.  
 
To enable cost effective emission reductions, issued permits can be traded 
among covered entities. Figure 4 depicts how emission permits can be traded 
between two entities (A and B) to control total emissions under a cap and trade 
ETS. If an entity has an excess of permits due to local emission reductions (entity 
A), they can sell extra permits for a profit to other entities (entity B) that need to 
buy more permits than they were allocated. Trade creates cost effective emission 
reductions, as entities with low abatement costs to reduce emissions (entity A) 
can sell excess permits; entities with high abatement costs (entity B) can buy 
excess permits for less than it would cost to reduce their own local emissions.  
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Figure 4. Fundamental Design of an C&T Emissions Trading System 
 
Source: McIntire, A. (2013): Carbon Emissions Cap and Trade is Here to Stay. FirstCarbon 
Solutions. Retrieved from: http://info.firstcarbonsolutions.com/blog/bid/266085/Carbon-Emissions-
Cap-and-Trade-in-California-is-Here-to-Stay 
 
In principle an ETS can enable emission reductions to occur at the least cost. 
Emissions limits allow CO2 discharge targets to be set based on a scientific 
consensus of appropriate levels. Auctioning of permits as a means of allocation 
can be a source of revenue. Permit trading can be designed to balance global 
inequalities of GHG emissions and reduction targets. An ETS enables the implicit 
price on carbon behind a CO2 cap, possibly making an ETS easier to implement 
politically. Since covered entities are motivated financially to reduce emissions, 
an ETS encourages innovation and investment in new low-carbon technologies 
(Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009).  
 
The weaknesses of an ETS include the uncertainty of the price of permits, which 
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can be a deterrent to long-term investments. An ETS can also be more open to 
political manipulation than some other methods of emission reduction if 
preference is given to certain parties over others during permit issuance. The 
information needed from covered entities to properly issue permits is more 
invasive than other forms of carbon pricing and could cause difficulties. The 
transaction costs are also relatively high. Baseline and credit style systems have 
much less certainty over emission amounts than the cap and trade style system, 
which may be a weakness (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). 
 
An emissions trading system can be developed from a scale as small as a town 
or city to as large as a global regime.  For example, a citywide ETS could be 
created to meet the requirements of a statewide cap or in response to federal 
rules. A global system could create a complicated interconnected web of trading 
systems around the world. 
 
As of 2015, about 40 national and 20 subnational systems put a price on carbon. 
Some nations or regions are choosing an ETS or a tax separately. Others 
combine the two to satisfy a state's individual situation (World Bank, 2014).  Both 
instruments put a price on carbon to raise revenues and affect economic 
decision-making based on the price of emitting GHGs. Both mechanisms also 
internalize the previous externality of releasing GHGs, so the choice between 
which of these instruments might not be as important as successfully 
implementing either one. The design details necessary to make the instrument 
successful at reducing carbon can be the most important aspect of setting up a 
carbon-pricing instrument (World Bank, 2014). 
 
 
 
 18 
United Nations’ Efforts to Reduce Greenhouse Gases 
 
In 1992 the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development 
(the Conference) was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. At the Conference, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
formed to create an international system to reduce GHG emissions. As part of 
this international treaty, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in Kyoto, Japan and 
came into effect in 2005.The Kyoto Protocol was the first document produced 
within the United Nations that defined measurable country target levels of GHG 
reductions while also creating the first international ETS designed to reduce GHG 
emissions (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). The protocol defines various 
reduction targets that require an 8-10 percent reduction in GHGs compared to the 
participating nations’ baseline level of emissions in 1990 (Brohe, Eyre, & 
Howarth, 2009). The protocol set global standards for emission reductions that 
can serve as an example to similar regional plans to follow. Some of the most 
innovative aspects of the Kyoto Protocol are the flexibility mechanisms involved.  
FLEXIBILITY MECHANISMS 
 
There are three flexibility mechanisms enacted through the Kyoto Protocol to 
help covered entities reduce emissions, International Emissions Trading (IET), 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI). The 
IET was put in place to achieve reductions at the lowest cost. The JI and CDM 
are project-based mechanisms that allowed covered nations to reduce emissions 
in areas outside of the covered nation’s boundaries (JI) and outside of the ETS 
boundary (CDM). These flexibility mechanisms are important because they have 
become models for similar mechanisms in other ETSs. 
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The International Emissions Trading (IET) mechanism allows covered entities to 
sell unused permits allocated to them previously. The ability to sell excess 
permits creates a new commodity in the form of emission reductions or “carbon,” 
therefore creating a carbon market (UNFCCC, 2014). The IET mechanism 
allowed the creation national and regional ETSs that could be used to help 
achieve emission reduction commitments.  
 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is an offset mechanism, as it allows 
entities with an emission reduction commitment to offset emissions by creating 
an emission reduction project in a developing country (UNFCCC, 2014). CDM 
projects can include constructing renewable energy systems, retrofitting 
manufacturing equipment with more energy efficient technology, capturing and/or 
destroying GHGs, and fuel switching to lower emitting fuel (Brokers Carbon, 
2010). When a covered entity develops an emissions reduction project in an 
approved developing country in accordance to CDM rules, additional permits are 
created and issued to the developer. These permits are called Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) or, less formally, “offsets.” These offsets can be applied to 
the developer’s emission reduction commitments or sold into the carbon market 
to any entity seeking to reduce emissions locally to meet the necessary quota. 
The CDM therefore allows developed countries to reduce emissions at low cost, 
even if the emissions are not in their home country (World Bank, 2014). It is 
important to note that while CERs are created in addition to the allowances 
issued by the UNFCCC, therefore increasing the amount of permits in the 
market, there are usually limits on how many CERs a covered entity can use to 
meet emission reduction requirements to promote local emission reductions.  
 
The CDM creates a business incentive for third party project developers to create 
CDM projects in exchange for CER credits that can be sold to covered entities for 
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a profit (Brokers Carbon, 2010). The mechanism has grown to achieve significant 
emission reductions in developing countries, in addition to directing investments 
to these countries to support sustainable low-carbon development (World Bank, 
2014). 
 
The Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism is similar to the CDM where covered 
entities can receive credits for reducing emissions offsite. Under the JI, entities 
can invest in emission reduction projects in other countries that are also covered 
under the Kyoto Protocol in order to receive reduction permits. Emissions 
reduction permits created under the JI mechanism are called Emission Reduction 
Units (ERU). 
NEGOTIATIONS STALLED 
 
As of April 2015 negotiations for further Kyoto Protocol implementation are 
essentially stalled. There are strong divisions among nations involved in the UN 
climate negotiations restricting further agreements or supplemental 
implementation plans. 
 
One component of UNFCCC climate negotiations disagreement is the 
international disparity in GHG emissions. Global emissions are far from uniform 
among nations of the world. The ranges of the levels of emissions are diversified 
in location and the specific sectors causing the emissions.  Figure 5 shows the 
differences in the levels of GHG emissions globally. There is little correlation 
between geographic location and GHG emissions. The figure illustrates that 
countries that emit less than 100MtCO2e per year geographically neighbor 
countries that emit over 1,000 MtCO2e per year. China’s GHG emissions are over 
1,000 MtCO2e per year. China’s neighboring country India has comparatively 
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high emissions. Myanmar, Kazakhstan and Vietnam also neighbor China but 
emit 100-1,000 MtCO2e per year. Mongolia, North Korea and Nepal also 
neighbor China but emit less than 100 MtCO2e per year.  
 
The differences in the amounts of emissions have created a divide between 
developing and developed countries. Developing countries argue that developed 
countries should have more commitments to reduce emissions because the 
developed countries have historically released more GHGs into the atmosphere 
and are therefore more responsible for climate change. The developing countries 
in part have been reticent to agree to binding emissions targets after 2020 until 
developed countries increase their level of ambition. Alternatively, developed 
countries want to see the negotiations create reduction targets for developing 
countries in order to not put developed economies at a clear disadvantage. This 
lack of ambition from both sides has slowed down the discussions on advancing 
any new international market based mechanisms to reduce emissions (World 
Bank, 2014). Such a drastic diversity of emissions internationally implies that 
international cooperation will be needed to take advantage of low-cost carbon 
control opportunities (World Bank, 2014). 
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Figure 5. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Country 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2014): State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014.  Washington, DC: World 
Bank Group. Retrieved from  
http://www- wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014 
/05/27/000456286_20140527095323/Rendered/PDF/882840AR0REPLA00EPI2102680Box3852
32.pdf 
 
Adding to the difficulties of the UNFCCC negotiations is that there is an 
oversupply of the Kyoto credits. Linked to the lack of ambitions under the 
UNFCCC, the demand remains low for Kyoto credits. As it currently stands, the 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol from 2013 - 2020, represents 
only 12 percent of global emissions (World Bank, 2014), well under the coverage 
necessary to prevent significant global temperature increases. In recent years the 
demand for credits from all three of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms has 
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declined. March 2014 had the lowest monthly CER issuance of the past three 
years. In addition there were also 10 percent fewer CDM projects (CER credits) 
registered in 2013 than in 2012 (World Bank, 2014). 
 
A few major emitters, such as Australia, have removed themselves from the 
Kyoto Protocol so the demand has become more depressed. Japan, Russia and 
New Zealand have withdrawn from the second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol but have stated they will continue their commitments towards reducing 
emissions. While trading is still permitted past 2014 there is little future trading 
expected unless significant adjustments are made to the current system (World 
Bank, 2014). 
FUTURE UNFCCC MEETINGS 
 
The Conference of the Parties (COP) are the annual meetings of the UNFCCC to 
discuss climate change. There is hope that the current issues with the Kyoto 
Protocol will be addressed during future meetings such as in Paris in 2015. The 
involved parties are being encouraged to submit post-2020 national mitigation 
"contributions" by the first quarter of 2015 in order to help achieve the milestone 
goal of agreeing to a binding resolution on global emissions at COP 21 in Paris 
scheduled for the end of 2015 (World Bank, 2014).  
 
The future of climate change mitigation remains unclear. The political, economic 
and cultural challenge of controlling the release of GHGs into the atmosphere is 
encouraging a range of potential policy solutions that price and control GHG 
emissions. ETSs have been gaining attention as a policy mechanism to 
potentially reduce GHG emissions at low marginal cost to emitters. While there 
are hopes that the Kyoto issues can be solved, there is increasing evidence that 
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the global trend of implementing ETSs is being directed towards increasing the 
strength of separate national and regional ETSs. These separate national and 
regional ETSs in principle could allow leaders to independently develop ETSs in 
order to fit the region specific situations. The next chapter will describe these 
national and regional ETSs and their various components. 
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CHAPTER II: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF  
EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS 
 
While the Kyoto Protocol sets limits on participating countries’ GHG emissions, 
the Protocol does not define how emission reductions should be achieved. Many 
countries have developed federal, regional or state-run ETSs to reduce 
emissions to meet Kyoto Protocol reductions (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). In 
preparation for any possible level of mandatory emission reductions, many 
countries, states, regions and even businesses are also measuring and reducing 
their own emissions, based on their economy’s most cost effective plan, so as to 
be prepared if an emissions cap is set.  
 
This bottom-up development of ETSs is in contrast to the expectations of some 
policy-makers and analysts in the 1990s and early 2000’s, who predicted that a 
global carbon market would come to fruition as a harmonized top-down system 
most likely led by the UNFCCC (World Bank, 2014). Each localized ETS has 
found that a bottom up development of an ETS has been more successful in 
finding region specific answers to questions like cap-setting, allocation, coverage 
and flexibility provisions (ICAP, 2014). The creation of localized ETSs is 
producing growing experience drawn from regions from diverse locations and 
levels of government around the world at different stages of development (World 
Bank, 2014). This experience of implementing carbon markets worldwide can 
potentially help to develop more robust and flexible future systems (World Bank, 
2014).  
 
The world's emissions trading systems are currently worth about $30 billion 
(World Bank, 2014). According to a report from Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 
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the global carbon market could increase up to $246 billion by 2020 (McCrone, 
2014). Emissions trading is gaining popularity as a global tool to reduce carbon 
emissions (World Bank, 2014).  
 
From 2005 to 2015, the share of global emissions covered by ETSs has 
increased by more than 70 percent (World Bank, 2014). Figure 6 below shows 
the ETS share of global GHG emissions. The figure illustrates that the EUETS 
has been the dominant ETS covering at least 3 percent of total global emissions 
since 2005. The figure also illustrates that the start of the Chinese pilot programs 
in 2013 increased GHG coverage significantly. While there has been an increase 
in ETS coverage of GHGs, the share of all global emissions covered by ETSs 
remains about 7 percent (World Bank, 2014). 
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Figure 6. ETS Share of Global GHG Emissions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2014): State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014.  Washington, DC: World 
Bank Group. Retrieved from http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/27/000456286_20140
527095323/Rendered/PDF/882840AR0REPLA00EPI2102680Box385232.pdf 
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Existing Emissions Trading Systems 
 
Below is a short overview of existing emissions trading systems. Table 2 lists 
some of the definitions used to describe these ETSs.  
Table 2. Global Overview of ETSs – Definitions  
Allocation 
 
The process in which emissions permits are divided and distributed to 
covered entities for the purpose of establishing a market. There are 
several methods for allocation including auctioning and free allocation 
(Michaelowa & Koch, 2001) 
Auctioning 
 
A method for distributing permits where permits are sold to the highest 
bidder  
Backloading 
 
 
 
A technique that has been designed to stabilize a carbon market by 
removing credits from the market in order to rerelease them into the 
market later 
 
Banking 
 
Saving permits in order to use them in the future, potentially in the next 
trading phase (Michaelowa & Koch, 2001)  
Benchmarking 
 
A way to set emissions targets and quotas based off of a determined 
average for the sector 
Borrowing 
 
When an entity is allowed to use permits from future phases in order to 
meet current obligations (Michaelowa & Koch, 2001)  
Bottom-up Design 
 
An ETS design where each individual nation or region creates its own 
ETS according to its own unique economic situation and then links 
systems together  
Cap 
 
The limit on the amount of permits released into a specific carbon 
market 
Coverage 
 
The determination of which sectors or entities meet the requirements of 
participating in an ETS and are therefore responsible for submitting 
permits for their emissions 
Credits (Permits) 
 
The individual units representing emission reductions that are bought 
and sold through the carbon market. Also referred to as Permits. 
(Brokers Carbon, 2010) 
Free allocation 
 
Usually a temporary measure that allocates permits to covered entities 
for free in order to introduce the concept of an ETS with as little 
resistance as possible 
Global Warming 
Potential (GWP) 
A measure of a specific gas’s potential to add to global warming. CO2 is 
often the standard measure that other gas’s GWP are measured against 
Grandfathering 
 
A method of setting emissions quotas based off of the historic emissions 
of the covered entity  
Linking 
 
A linkage between ETSs occurs when permits from one system are 
eligible to be used in another system.  
Market Stability 
Reserve 
A backloading technique implemented by the European Union ETS 
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Table 2. (Continued) Global Overview of ETSs – Definitions  
Offsets 
 
A reduction of GHG emissions typically made offsite where reducing 
emissions is cheaper 
Permits (Credits) The individual units representing emission reductions that are bought 
and sold through the carbon market. Also referred to as credits (Brokers 
Carbon, 2010) 
Phases A predetermined set of time that an ETS sets specific deadlines and 
requirements for compliance. Splitting an ETS into phases allows any 
necessary adjustments to be made to the system 
System 
 
Refers to an emissions trading system 
Soft Cap 
 
When an ETS has a soft cap, it does not have limits on all the permits or 
offsets eligible for compliance 
Synthetic GHGs 
 
Manmade gases that contribute to global warming that do not occur in 
nature. Synthetic GHGs are usually a byproduct of certain industrial 
processes. 
Top-down Design An ETS design where a majority of global GHG emissions are covered 
by one predetermined trading system 
Voluntary ETS 
 
An ETS where entities join voluntarily to reduce emissions with the cost 
saving benefits of an ETS 
 
 
Table 3 gives a brief summary of the existing ETSs including their operational 
details, strengths and weaknesses. These systems will be described in detail 
below. 
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 Table 3. Existing Emissions Trading Systems 
ETS Operational Details Strengths Weaknesses 
European 
Union 
(EUETS) 
- Largest and longest running cap and 
trade system that covers 31 countries 
- Created in response to EU’s emission 
reduction commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol 
- Trading phases have been aligned to 
match Kyoto’s phases 
- Serves as a standard to compare all 
other systems too 
- Globally accounts for over 3/4 of the 
trading volume in international markets 
- The system has been unable to cope with 
economic downturn in 2008 and is suffering 
from an oversupply of permits 
- The predefined supply of allowances is 
unable to adjust to macro-economic 
changes 
Korea 
- Designed to meet Korea’s emission 
reduction target of 30% by 2020 
- Covers 60% of GHG emissions 
including all six gases covered by Kyoto 
- Multiple phases of the ETS allow 
market stabilization and allocation 
readjustments 
- Each phase has different offset and 
allocation requirements to allow for 
experimentation 
- The industrial sector of Korea has been 
voicing opposition to the ETS which could 
impede the progress (IETA, 2013) 
New 
Zealand  
- Covers all 6 Kyoto gases with an 
overall coverage of 52% of emissions 
- Has a “soft cap” that allows unlimited 
international offsets  
-The soft cap gives insight into linking 
ETSs 
- Most covered entities have used low-
priced international offsets instead of 
reducing emissions locally resulting in 
minimal local GHG reductions 
Kazakhstan - Originally based off of free allocation of permits but will start auctions in 2016 
- Offers a unique look into how 
emissions trading can work in central 
Asia 
- There have been difficulties collecting 
accurate emissions data at the installation 
level 
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Table 3. (Continued) Existing Emissions Trading Systems 
ETS Operational Details Strengths Weaknesses 
 
Switzerland 
-The system is mandatory for large 
energy intensive industries  
- Medium-sized industries can choose 
to opt in on a voluntary basis 
- Allows CDM offsets but with 
restrictions to demonstrate other 
available forms of linkages  
- Negotiations on linking with the EUETS 
have been ongoing but slow 
 
Japan Joint 
Crediting 
Mechanism 
(JCM) 
- Not necessarily an ETS but a unique 
crediting mechanism for the voluntary 
Japanese ETS. 
- Modeled after the CDM to offset 
credits in developing countries in 
exchange for technology transfer 
- Decentralized, bilateral agreements 
are formed with individual developing 
countries 
 - The separate bilateral agreements 
keep the mechanism simple and 
practical 
- Forgoes the complexities of the CDM 
design features 
- Flexible bilateral agreements are 
potentially easier to agree upon 
- Simplification of the process drastically 
reduces the accuracy of measuring the 
emission reductions 
Tokyo 
- City-wide ETS 
- Created in response to the emission 
reduction commitments in 2010 as part 
of Japan’s first mandatory ETS.  
- While the ETS is not very large 
compared to national systems it holds 
the important role of adjusting 
Japanese industry to emissions trading 
- Due to the shutdown of nuclear power the 
emission reduction targets are still 
considered a 3.1% increase above 1990 
levels 
Regional 
Greenhouse 
Gas 
Initiative 
(RGGI) 
-  A regional ETS covering nine US 
states 
- The ETS was reformed in Jan 2014 to 
reduce the cap on emissions 
- RGGI is the first US ETS designed to 
mitigate climate change 
- The successful reforms are an 
example of a smaller system’s 
flexibility 
- Covers only CO2 emissions 
- Uncertainty over if the emissions 
reductions in the region should be credited 
to RGGI or the decline in natural gas prices 
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Table 3. (Continued) Existing Emissions Trading Systems 
ETS Operational Details Strengths Weaknesses 
California 
AB32 
- Statewide cap and trade system as 
part of the Global Warming Solutions 
Act of 2006 
- Valued at over $1 billion 
- Considered by many to be the start of 
a potential bottom-up system in the US 
-Since there is not overarching national 
legislation, the state must commit extra 
resources to promote efficiency and prevent 
leakage in order to achieve true emission 
reductions (IETA, 2013) 
Western 
Climate 
Initiative 
(WCI) 
- An international cap and trade 
program between the US and Canada 
-Voluntary participation 
- The initial phase has focused on large 
scale emitters while the second will 
include smaller emissions sources 
-Initially covered 70% of the Canadian 
economy and 20% of the US economy 
- Most US states have formally left the WCI 
for economic and political reasons 
- The lack of participation shows the 
weakness of a voluntary system 
Quebec 
 
- Started as the key to Quebec’s climate 
change policy. 
 
- The ETS is a source of revenue to 
other parts in the province’s overall 
Climate Change Action Plan 
- The ETS is expected to cover 86% of 
the province’s emissions 
- Most of Quebec’s energy comes from 
hydropower leaving little room for emission 
reductions in the power sector (IETA, 2013) 
Australia - Originally planned to be a carbon tax 
that would have transferred into a nation 
ETS then link with international markets 
- The ETS has been removed due to a 
change of government  
- Implemented new features such as 
emissions targets that adjust to a 
changing market 
- Originally set to be one of the most 
inclusive compliance based ETS 
- Removal of the system shows 
vulnerabilities to changes in political leaders 
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EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM   
 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EUETS) is the best known, 
largest and longest running cap and trade arrangement, as it has been in place 
since 2005 and was created in response to the EU's emission reduction 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce emissions by 2012 to 8 percent 
below 1990 levels. The EUETS covers 31 countries, 12,000 power and 
manufacturing plants, 46 percent of the region’s emissions and 4.636 Mt of CO2e 
(Watanabe & Robinson, 2005), or over 75 percent of the trading volume in 
international markets (Jegou & Hawkins, 2014). The EUETS has three planned 
phases. The first phase was a trial phase implemented from 2005-2007. The 
timeline of the second phase matched Kyoto's phase from 2008-2012. The third 
phase started in 2013 and will continue until 2020. Most recently the EU 
realigned the emission reduction goals to cut emissions 20 percent compared to 
1990 levels over the third phase (IETA, 2014). 
 
The EUETS has been unable to cope with the major economic downturn from 
2008 to 2015, which has reduced confidence in the EUETS. The European 
system was created in 2005 and had predicted future emissions based on 
historic rates. However the 2008 economic crisis was not anticipated in its 
planning. The reduction of economic activity during the economic crisis resulted 
in unexpected low emissions within the EUETS and left a large supply of issued 
emissions allowances that covered entities did not need to use. The emission 
permit oversupply has grown to about the size of one annual emission budget for 
the EUETS (Gunter, 2014). The oversupply has lowered the prices of the permits 
so low that there is no longer an economic incentive to sell or buy permits, 
essentially disabling the foundational driver of an ETS (Grubb, 2009).  
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There was already strong volatility in the carbon market before 2008. When the 
ETS started, the allowance prices ranged from EUR 20-25/tCO2 and peaked at 
EUR 30 (Grubb, 2009). In May 2006 the publication of emissions data from 2005 
was posted that showed the emissions from the year were 5 percent below the 
allocated amount of allowances. Prices fell dramatically, declining more than 
EUR 10/tCO2 over two days (Jegou & Rubini, 2011). From 2008 to 2009 the 
market became volatile; market prices dropped 75 percent from previous years to 
between EUR 8 to EUR 15 per credit (Brokers Carbon, 2011). The current 
allowance price as of April 2015 is EUR 7.33/tCO2 (European Energy Exchange, 
2015). The EUETS was the first trading system of this type in the world, so some 
volatility was expected, but not to this extent (Brokers Carbon, 2011).  
 
Why did the price of carbon drop by 75 percent? The reduced emissions during 
the recession were one factor as a low carbon price during a recession is normal 
(Gunter, 2014). Another cause may have been the increase in renewable energy 
in the EU after 2005 (World Bank, 2014). No matter the cause of oversupply in 
permits, the EUETS failed to operate as planned; with an inflexible, predefined 
supply of allowances, the system was unable to adjust to macro-economic 
changes (World Bank, 2014). 
 
Solutions to the oversupply have been a contentious issue for years and have 
ignited discussion on how or if the market should be adjusted. One EUETS 
proposal has been a 40 percent GHG reduction target increase for all of the EU 
countries below 1990 levels (World Bank, 2014). Other proposals are an increase 
in the rate of the annual cap reduction or requiring all emissions reductions to be 
achieved within the EU, without offsets outside of the EU (World Bank, 2014). 
Another proposal is an agreement for a EUETS market stability reserve to 
stabilize the market (World Bank, 2014). 
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A market stability reserve is comparable to the philosophy of “saving in a time of 
plenty to use in a time of shortage.” The reserve removes emission credits from a 
market to drive prices up. Saved credits can be released on a later date when the 
prices are hopefully higher. The European Parliament had been debating a vote 
to initiate a market stability reserve called the “backloading measure” that would 
postpone the auctioning of 900 million permits from 2013 - 2015 until 2019-2020 
(Nichols, 2014). The debates have affected the price of the EU permits. Figure 7 
shows the EUETS allowance price in relation to the European Parliament’s 
debates over the backloading measure. The figure illustrates that votes against 
backloading led the price of EUETS allowances to decrease, while steps taken 
by the European Parliament towards approving the backloading measure raised 
the EUETS price. After the vote’s initial failure, the European Parliament 
eventually approved the measure in 2013. The figure shows that the vote’s 
success has slightly increased the carbon price to EUR 5/tCO2 (European 
Energy Exchange, 2014).
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Figure 7. EUETS Allowance Price History 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2014): State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014.  Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Retrieved from http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/27/000456286_20140527095323/Rendered/PDF/882840AR0R
EPLA00EPI2102680Box385232.pdf
 
 
 37 
KOREA  
 
The republic of Korea has an emission reduction target designed to cut 30 
percent of emissions (233 MtCO2e) by 2020 (ICAP, 2014) through an emissions 
trading system that started in January 2015. The Korean ETS covers about 60 
percent of GHG emissions including all six gases covered under the Kyoto 
agreement, either directly or indirectly. The ETS has multiple phases in order to 
allow market stabilization and allocation readjustment. Each of the phases 
includes different requirements on offsets (domestic only) and the amount of 
permits that will be allocated for free. The Korean ETS also allows the banking 
and borrowing of permits with a 10 percent limit (World Bank, 2014). According to 
the Korean Ministry of Environment, the country is currently on track to meet their 
reduction goals due to the Korean National GHG Emissions Reduction Roadmap 
2020 (ICAP, 2014). 
NEW ZEALAND  
 
The New Zealand emissions trading system (NZETS) was created in 2008 and 
covers all 6 Kyoto Protocol gases, with an overall coverage of 52 percent of 
emissions (ICAP, 2014). The sectors covered include forestry, liquid fossil fuels, 
stationary energy, industrial processes, waste and synthetic GHGs. The NZETS 
is unique because it has a “soft cap” based on no limits to allowable international 
offsets. This program illustrates links among international ETSs. Due to the 
record low prices of international credits, most covered sectors in the NZETS 
have opted to use a majority of international offsets to meet quotas. This 
international reliance on offsets led to little actual domestic reductions, as there is 
no financial incentive to avoid emissions locally when inexpensive international 
offsets can be purchased (World Bank, 2014).  
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KAZAKHSTAN 
 
The Kazakhstan ETS (KAZ ETS) started with a pilot program in 2013. It allowed 
100 percent free allocation of credits based on historical emissions. Currently 
banking, borrowing and international credits are not allowed. The ETS design 
includes plans to start auctioning and benchmarking permits in 2016. Kazakhstan 
has had issues related to collecting accurate emissions data at the installation 
level (ICAP, 2014). 
SWITZERLAND 
  
The Swiss Emissions Trading System covers 55 companies from 25 business 
sectors (World Bank, 2014). The system was voluntary in 2008 and became 
mandatory in 2013 for large energy intensive industries (>20MW thermal input 
and other specific thresholds). Medium-sized industries (>10MW) can choose to 
opt in on a voluntary basis (ICAP, 2014). Switzerland’s ETS allows CDM offsets 
with restrictions. Negotiations linking the Swiss ETS with the EUETS have been 
ongoing at a slow pace.  
JAPAN - JOINT CREDITING OFFSET MECHANISM  
 
Japan is not participating in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
but the country still aims to reduce emissions to target levels (ICAP, 2014). 
During the 19th Conference of Parties in Warsaw, Poland in 2013, Japan 
announced an emission reduction target of 3.8 percent below 2005 levels by the 
year 2020, a volume considered an emissions increase of 3.1 percent above 
1990 levels (ICAP, 2014). The reason for the commitment above 1990, as 
opposed to below, reflects the shutdown of nuclear energy in Japan after the 
Fukushima incident in 2011. Japan has had a voluntary ETS since 2005 set up 
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by the Ministry of Environment as a means to reduce GHG emissions and meet 
these reduction targets (ICAP, 2014). 
 
While Japan does not have a national compliance ETS, its Joint Crediting Offset 
Mechanism (JCM) allows the voluntary emissions that can offset credits, 
modeled after the CDM. Through the JCM, Japan allows offset emissions in 
select developing nations. Participating Japanese entities can purchase the 
reduction credits to meet voluntary emissions goals. The JCM uses a 
decentralized structure, so Japan has created separate bilateral agreements with 
each participating nation to suit the specific circumstance of each developing 
country to keep the mechanism simple and practical. The overall crediting 
mechanism forgoes many of the complexities that slow the functioning of the 
CDM, as the JCM focuses on simplicity and the practicality of implementation. 
While this method may sacrifice accuracy, its ease of implementation should help 
program implementation. Bilateral agreements can be designed for any 
developing nation, improving political flexibility. Twelve nations have signed 
bilateral agreements with Japan to reduce local emissions locally in exchange for 
Japanese technology transfer: Mongolia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Maldives, 
Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, Costa Rica, Palau, Cambodia, and India (MOE, 2013). 
TOKYO  
 
The Tokyo ETS was created in response to Japanese emission reduction 
commitments in 2010 as Japan's first mandatory ETS. The ETS regulates 
commercial and industrial GHGs in large Tokyo buildings, representing about 18 
percent of municipal emissions (ICAP, 2014). The ETS allows restricted domestic 
offsets, grandfathering and banking, but not borrowing (ICAP, 2014). The Tokyo 
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ETS is not large compared to national ETSs but it represents an example of how 
the Japanese industry adjusts to emissions trading (World Bank, 2014).   
UNITED STATES  
 
The US is the second largest emitter of GHGs (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). 
The country has around 4 percent of the world population but was responsible for 
more than 13 percent of global GHG emissions in 2011 (WRI, 2015). If US 
emissions were measured and included in a national ETS, it would be three times 
the size of the EUETS (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). Before the 
announcement of China's national ETS, a US ETS had the potential to be the 
largest emissions trading system in the world (Brokers Carbon, 2011).  
 
While the US does not have a national ETS, it remains a focus regarding climate 
change and emissions trading because any decision to limit GHGs in the United 
States would reduce emissions globally and could inspire creation of other ETSs 
(Brokers Carbon, 2011).  
 
The United States has had an interesting history in regards to emissions trading. 
The US Congress passed the Acid Rain Program of 1990 (Title IV of the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments). As initiated by the US congress and implemented 
by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the acid rain system allowed 
market-based emissions trading to reduce sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide 
emissions from power plants, a cause of acid rain (Chestnut & Mills, 2005). The 
EPA claims that the Acid Rain Program has reduced targeted emissions by 80 
percent from 1990 levels from what they would have been without the program 
(Chestnut & Mills, 2005). The program is generally considered a success and an 
example of how emissions trading can reduce emissions cost efficiently with 
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minimal negative consequences in the covered economy.  
 
The Acid Rain Program can be used as an example of a successful ETS in the 
US. However there are differences between the Acid Rain Program and an ETS 
seeking to mitigate climate change. Carbon reduction may require shifts in 
energy use, while for acid rain and other airborne pollutants such as ozone 
depleting substances, there are often alternatives to the substances that are 
being used (Victor, 2011). 
 
Following the success of the Acid Rain program, Senator Henry Waxman 
introduced the American Clean Energy and Security Act in 2009. The bill passed 
in the House but failed in the Senate. One analyst argued that though the bill 
failed in the Senate based on arguments over the ETS’s potential damages to the 
US economy and concerns over nations such as China not being limited by their 
GHG emissions (Victor, 2011). 
 
Some domestic pressure may develop in the US towards limiting GHG 
emissions. In 2012, the US experienced both the warmest year on record and the 
second most extreme weather events in a year on record (Foderaro, 2014). On 
September 21, 2014 more than 400,000 people protested in what has been 
called the People’s Climate March in New York City as a show of support for 
action against climate change by surrounding the United Nations Climate Summit 
that same week (Foderaro, 2014). 
 
In the summer of 2014, the US EPA released a draft Clean Power Plan, the Plan 
proposed regulation to reduce 30 percent of carbon emissions from US power 
plants by the year 2030. The Plan limits carbon emissions from both new power 
plants and existing power plants. Although the Plan does not set up an ETS, it 
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allows states to select means to limit emissions, with an ETS as one option. 
Other options for reducing emissions include installing more energy efficient 
technologies or switching fuel sources away from older coal-fired power plants. 
EPA has asked US states to submit plans to limit emissions by 2016 so that 
plans could be enacted by 2020 (US White House, 2014). 
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE  
  
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a regional market-based GHG 
reduction program covering CO2 emissions from power plants in nine US states: 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
York, Rhode Island and Vermont. New Jersey was originally part of the program 
but withdrew in 2011 (Bifera, 2013). The RGGI was the first US ETS designed to 
mitigate climate change and covers 22 percent of CO2 emissions from the region 
(ICAP, 2014). Domestic offsets can be used to offset 3.3 percent of emission 
requirements. If prices exceed a certain amount in a year, the offset limit will be 
increased to 10 percent (Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009). Some analysts have 
estimated that RGGI has prevented 12 million tons of emissions from reaching 
the atmosphere since its first auction in 2008, which equates to a 30 percent 
reduction in the regional power sector’s emissions (Maracci, 2013a). 
 
The RGGI was founded in 2003 but the first compliance period started in 2009. In 
its initial stages the program did not lower the cap on emissions because the 
initial goal of the program was to measure and control emissions accurately and 
later reduce the cap six years after the program’s start. Originally the initiative 
planned to reduce the cap by 2.5 percent each year between 2015 and 2018 
(Brohe, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009).  
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The RGGI states recently made a successful change to their initial rules in order 
to avoid an oversupply of permits. In January 2014, the states had completed 
revisions to state CO2 budget trading programs and found that the RGGI cap was 
too high. As the high cap had the potential to create a permit oversupply, the 
states decided to reduce the cap. The new cap is a 45 percent reduction from the 
previous cap and is now set at 91 million tons of CO2. Each year, the cap will 
decline 2.5 percent until the year 2020 (World Bank, 2014). RGGI’s success in 
changing the system’s initial rules is an example of the benefits of a smaller, 
more flexible system. (Maracci, 2013a).  
CALIFORNIA AB32 
 
The California Assembly Bill 32 (AB32) passed a statewide cap and trade 
system, valued at over $1 billion, as part of the Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006 that targets facilities with emissions of over 25,000 tons of CO2 per year. 
The California ETS was created with the goal of reducing CO2 emissions to 1990 
levels by 2020. Trial auctions began in 2012. Enforcement of emissions limits 
started on January 1, 2013 for large industrial facilities and electricity generation 
plants (California Air Resources Board, 2006). The cap started declining 3 
percent each year from the start.  During phase one (2013-2014), only electricity 
generation plants and industrial sources were included resulting in coverage of 
15 percent of California’s emissions. During the second phase starting in 2015, 
natural gas plants and transportation fuels will be included. AB32 plans to link to 
Quebec’s market under the WCI which will increase the overall market by 20 
percent (Maracci, 2013b).  
WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE 
 
The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is a bilateral cap and trade program 
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between the U.S. and Canada designed to reduce GHG emissions in the 
participating states and provinces to 15 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 
(Western Climate Initiative, 2013). The initial partner US states include Arizona, 
California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Washington, which 
constitute 20 percent of the U.S. economy (Western Climate Initiative, 2010). 
Canadian province partners included British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and 
Quebec, which constitute 70 percent of the Canadian economy (Western Climate 
Initiative, 2010). On November 18, 2011 Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Utah and Washington left the WCI due to economic concerns and changes in 
political leadership (World Bank, 2014). This lack of participation shows the 
weakness of a voluntary cap-and-trade system.  
 
The first phase began on January 1, 2012 and focused on large-scale industries 
where emission measurement systems were already in place, including electricity 
plants, electricity imports and industrial combustion sites (Western Climate 
Initiative, 2010). The second phase is planned to begin in 2015 and will include 
smaller emission sources such as transportation fuels, residential buildings, and 
remaining commercial emission sites that were not covered in the initial phase. 
Figure 8 shows the current state of the WCI with arrows representing potential 
linkages. The remaining participants in the WCI are California, British Columbia, 
Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. Figure 8 illustrates the linkages being considered 
between California and British Columbia, California and Ontario, and Manitoba 
and British Columbia (Western Climate Initiative, 2010).  
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Figure 8. Western Climate Initiative 
 
QUEBEC 
 
Quebec started a cap and trade ETS in January 2013 as a source of revenue to 
other areas of the province’s overall Climate Change Action Plan. The ETS 
covers 29.4 percent of the province’s emissions and has linked with the California 
ETS in 2014 as part of the Western Climate Initiative. The 2015 coverage is 
expected to cover up to 86 percent of Quebec’s emissions (World Bank, 2014).  
AUSTRALIA  
 
Australia had planned an ETS but a change of government resulted in a 
cancellation of the plan. The Carbon Pollution Reduction System (CPRS) had 
used lessons learned from past ETSs and implemented new features such as 
emissions targets that adjust to a changing market. The initial carbon tax would 
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have transferred into a national ETS and then eventually link with other 
international markets such as the EUETS. The Australian ETS included 70-80 
percent of Australian emissions (Brokers Carbon, 2011). 
 
Australia's planned price on carbon has been a topic of debate in the country. In 
July 2014 the Australian senate voted to remove the existing carbon tax and the 
planned emissions trading system. The country still has an announced 
commitment to reduce emissions by 5 percent compared with year 2000 levels 
by the year 2020, but without the ETS there is not a strong plan to achieve these 
goals. Australia will still retain its Clean Energy Finance Corporation, a $10 billion 
government-backed loan agency to help shift electricity targets to renewable 
sources (Siegel, 2014). 
EMERGING ETSS  
 
There are a number of emerging ETSs that are under discussion or 
consideration. Possible future emissions trading systems and crediting 
approaches include: British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, 
Japan, Thailand, Turkey and the Ukraine (World Bank, 2014). Figures 9 and 10 
illustrate the existing ETSs described as well as the ETSs under consideration. 
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Figure 9. Existing and Considered ETSs – Western Hemisphere 
 
Information Compiled From:  
1) International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) (2014): Emissions Trading Worldwide Status 
Report 2014. Retrieved from https://icapcarbonaction.com/news/news-archive/209-emissions-
trading-worldwide-icap-status-report-2014 
2) World Bank (2014): State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014.  Washington, DC: World Bank 
Group. Retrieved from http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/27/000456286_20140
527095323/Rendered/PDF/882840AR0REPLA00EPI2102680Box385232.pdf 
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Figure 10. Existing and Considered ETSs – Eastern Hemisphere 
 
 
 
Information Compiled From:  
1) International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) (2014): Emissions Trading Worldwide Status 
Report 2014. Retrieved from https://icapcarbonaction.com/news/news-archive/209-emissions-
trading-worldwide-icap-status-report-2014 
2) World Bank (2014): State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014.  Washington, DC: World Bank 
Group. Retrieved from http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/27/000456286_20140
527095323/Rendered/PDF/882840AR0REPLA00EPI2102680Box385232.pdf 
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Emissions Trading System Components 
 
There are a number of components that are common to ETSs but can vary 
amongst systems including coverage, leakage, allocation/issuance, registries, 
penalties for noncompliance, temporal flexibility including borrowing and banking, 
new entrants, offsets, additionality, monitoring reporting and verification (MRV), 
permanence and double counting. Table 4 lists these items and their definitions.  
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Table 4. ETS Components - Definitions 
Additionality 
 
 
A measure to ensure that the emissions reductions from a project 
would not have happened without the additional funding of the sale of 
emissions permits 
Allocation 
 
The process in which emissions permits are divided and distributed to 
covered entities for the purpose of establishing a market. There are 
several methods for allocation including auctioning and free allocation 
(Michaelowa & Koch, 2001) 
Banking 
 
Saving permits in order to use them in the future, potentially in the next 
trading phase (Michaelowa & Koch, 2001)  
Borrowing 
 
When an entity is allowed to use permits from future phases in order to 
meet current obligations (Michaelowa & Koch, 2001)  
Coverage  
 
The determination of which sectors or entities meet the requirements of 
participating in an ETS and are therefore responsible for submitting 
permits for their emissions 
Double Counting 
 
An issue that can occur if the same emission reductions are accounted 
for more than once!
Leakage 
 
Leakage occurs when a polluting industry moves from a region covered 
by an ETS to an area that is not covered in order to avoid paying for 
emissions 
Monitoring, 
Reporting and 
Verification (MRV)  
A process that ensures that permanent emissions reductions are 
actually occurring through a emission reduction project 
New Entrants 
 
A firm that is covered under an ETS but was not previously covered 
Noncompliance 
 
Noncompliance occurs when an entity fails to fulfill emission reduction 
requirements (Michaelowa & Koch, 2001). A penalty is usually 
assigned in addition to the added burden of having to submit the 
missing permits during the following year (Jegou & Rubini, 2011).  
Offsets 
 
A reduction of GHG emissions typically made offsite where reducing 
emissions is cheaper 
Permanence A requirement to ensure that emission reductions are permanent 
 
Registries 
 
Digital inventories of credits set up to track the allocation and trading of 
the permits (Brokers Carbon, 2011) 
Temporal 
Flexibility 
 
Temporal flexibility allows covered entities to make use of permits 
issued in the past or future phases of an ETS as opposed to only using 
the permits issued as part of the current phase. 
COVERAGE  
 
The term ‘coverage’ of an ETS can refer to the sectors of the area’s economy 
that are responsible for submitting permits for emissions. Figure 11 illustrates 
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sectors commonly covered including industry, power, buildings, waste, transport, 
aviation, forestry, and agriculture. Stationary sources of GHG emissions such as 
power, industry and buildings are commonly covered. Figure 11 illustrates that 
almost every ETS covers at least one of these sectors. Forestry, agriculture, 
aviation, transport and waste sectors are not covered in nearly as many systems. 
For example, aviation is only covered in the EU ETS and the Shanghai ETS: 
forestry is only covered in the New Zealand ETS and agriculture is only covered 
in the Kazakhstan ETS. Difficulties in measuring emissions and determining if 
entities are eligible for the system make these sectors more difficult to include in 
an ETS.  
 
Coverage can also refer to the specific GHGs covered by an ETS. While CO2 is 
the most frequent GHG, other gases that affect climate change can be covered 
such as methane (CH4) or industrial gases such as nitrous oxide (N2O) and 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs). ETS coverage will vary depending on each region’s 
GHG emission situation. The coverage of more sectors or GHGs does not 
necessarily make an ETS more efficient at reducing GHGs. Coverage of more 
gases can provide more abatement options, which may decrease overall 
mitigation costs (ICAP, 2014).
 
 
 52 
Figure 11. Sectoral Coverage of Regional, National, and Subnational ETSs 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2014): State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014.  Washington, DC: World 
Bank Group. Retrieved from http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/27/000456286_20140
527095323/Rendered/PDF/882840AR0REPLA00EPI2102680Box385232.pdf 
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LEAKAGE  
 
Leakage describes a problem related to coverage that occurs when a polluting 
industry moves to avoid paying for emissions from a region covered by an ETS to 
a region not covered. When leakage occurs, fewer net emissions are reduced 
from the atmosphere. To avoid leakage issues, an ETS governing body may 
investigate firms more. If it is determined that a covered entity shifts polluting 
operations outside of the range of the ETS, some nations may issue a 
percentage of permits free of charge which could reduce the compliance costs for 
covered entities (ICAP, 2014).  
ALLOCATION/ISSUANCE 
 
The allocation of emissions permits may occur through either an auction system 
or through the free allocation of permits. Free allocation is usually a temporary 
measure. Some ETSs start with the free allocation of emissions to introduce the 
ETS with little resistance from covered entities before auctioning permits (Jegou 
& Rubini, 2011). 
REGISTRIES 
 
Digital registries track the allocation or trades of issued permits or credits. Buying 
and selling credits is similar to buying and selling shares in a stock market. 
Credits can be registered in an official registry that accounts and traces 
exchanges of credits because no physical asset changes hands (Brokers 
Carbon, 2011). Registries are not always restricted to only entities covered under 
an ETS. Third parties can sometimes purchase permits from the market registries 
in order to retire credits or remove the credits from the market, as they will not 
have any value because they are essentially erased. If an environmental 
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organization or another government were to buy credits and then retire them to 
remove them from the market, such an action could stop GHGs from being 
emitted into the atmosphere and may raise the price on remaining credits.   
PENALTIES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE 
 
If an entity fails to submit the appropriate amount of permits at the required time, 
a penalty is usually assigned in the form of a fee and the entity may be required 
to submit missing permits during the following phase (Jegou & Rubini, 2011). 
This ensures that emission reductions will still be taking place, by preventing a 
covered entity from deciding to pay the fine instead of reducing emissions. 
TEMPORAL FLEXIBILITY 
 
Banking or borrowing permits are types of temporal flexibility that allow a covered 
entity to make use of permits issued in the past or future phases of an emissions 
trading system, as opposed to only being able to use permits issued in the 
current phase. 
BORROWING  
 
Borrowing permits allows a covered entity to use permits from future phases in 
order to cover any possible permit shortages of the entity in a current phase 
(Michaelowa & Koch, 2001). If permits are borrowed, less permits will be issued 
the following year, so risk is involved. Borrowing is possible when an ETS issues 
permits for the next year before the submission deadline for the current year. 
Allowing borrowing can be attractive in the design of an ETS because this helps 
control excess demand for permits around the submission date which could 
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cause distortions in the permit price and overall market (Heindl and Loschel, 
2012).  
BANKING  
 
Banking of permits allows an entity to save unused permits for future use 
(Michaelowa & Koch, 2001). This rule would be prevent a “use it or lose it” 
mentality, where a covered firm would continue polluting even when it may not be 
necessary to avoid having to complete the polluting task in the future when 
permits are less available (Jegou & Rubini, 2014). Entities would benefit from 
banking permits if there were forecasts that permit prices would rise in the future 
so that they could later sell the permits for a profit. The covered entity might also 
want to bank permits as insurance for the future to avoid having to buy additional 
permits at a high price. A concern with banking is if there could be an unforeseen 
situation that creates an oversupply of permits in the market such as the current 
situation within the EUETS. The oversupply or any other distortion could continue 
to be an issue in future phases (Jegou & Rubini, 2014).  
NEW ENTRANTS 
 
There is usually a reserve of credits set aside under the rules of the ETS for new 
entities that should be covered but did not exist at the start of the ETS and 
therefore were not able to have the benefit of receiving free allowances when the 
ETS started. The reason for the reserve is that without free allowances for new 
entities, the cost of starting a new firm would be much higher than the existing 
firms paid before the ETS. This situation could effectively rule out competition for 
existing firms. 
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OFFSETS 
 
An offset is a reduction of GHG emissions typically made offsite where reducing 
emissions is cheaper. An entity covered under an ETS could pay to reduce 
emissions offsite while receiving credits in return that could then be used to meet 
permit requirements. An offset is allowed because the effects of GHGs are global 
and do not depend on the source of emissions, so reducing emissions is not 
dependent on location. An example could be described through a power plant 
covered by an ETS. If the covered power plant is equipped with advanced 
technology and costs were very high to reduce emissions locally, the plant could 
pay for another power plant outside of the ETS to reduce emissions (depending 
on the ETS offsetting rules). In exchange, the covered plant could receive 
permits for the GHG reductions that it would then be able to use to meet the GHG 
reduction quota.  
 
The ability to offset emissions creates opportunities for ETSs to link, promote 
technology transfer and enable sustainable development in nations not within the 
ETS. Offsets can reduce inequalities of emission commitments and 
responsibilities if a global emissions trading system is adopted. 
ADDITIONALITY 
 
Additionality is a measure to ensure that the emission reductions from a project 
would not have happened without the additional funding from the sale of 
emissions permits. If an energy efficiency project would have occurred because 
of price savings without the assistance from the sale of the resulting carbon 
credits, no actual emissions were avoided, a process that could undermine the 
purpose of emissions trading (Brokers Carbon, 2011). 
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MONITORING, REPORTING AND VERIFICATION   
 
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) are processes that verify that an 
offset project is meeting its goal of reducing net emissions. A third party auditor 
and the governing body that originally approved the project will usually review 
project records to confirm that emission reductions are taking place (Michaelowa 
& Koch, 2001). MRV is considered a critical component to offset projects. Any 
mistakes in the MRV procedure will undermine the entire project because actual 
emissions or emissions reductions may not be taking place (Brokers Carbon, 
2011). 
PERMANENCE 
 
Permanence is a requirement of offset projects to ensure that any emission 
reductions are permanent.  If an offset project avoids emissions for a temporary 
amount of time only to release the emissions into the atmosphere years later, the 
emissions reduction would not be valid. The ETS would only be temporarily 
successful in delaying the long-term effects of climate change. This situation will 
essentially defeat the purpose of the emission reduction project.  
 
Permanence requirements can be a deciding factor in creating certain types of 
offset projects that capture and store CO2 from the atmosphere.  Proving that 
emissions are still stored in a carbon sink requires expensive monitoring that may 
not be feasible especially without a set project end date. Validation of permanent 
reductions is a concern constraining the development of a type of credit. For 
example, should landowners of forested areas receive carbon credits for CO2 that 
a forested area naturally sequesters from the atmosphere? If a plot of trees is 
awarded credits for removing CO2 from the atmosphere, but are cut down years 
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later to release the captured CO2, permanent emission reductions have not 
actually occurred.  
DOUBLE COUNTING 
 
Double counting is a situation that occurs when the same emission reductions 
are accounted for more than once. For example, if an offset project prevents 100 
tons of CO2 and is awarded 100 credits from one carbon credit market such as 
Kyoto CER credits, and then the same entity is also awarded 100 separate 
carbon credits from another local or regional system, 200 carbon credits would 
be issued that account for only 100 tons of actual emission reductions. This 
situation should invalidate half of the total credits, or it could be said that each 
credit is only half valid. Emission reductions have then been accounted for and 
paid for while the credits in the market do not actually represent reduced CO2 in 
the atmosphere. This situation produces more permits in the market than actual 
emission reductions, which could undermine the market if the permits do not 
measure emission reductions.  
 
The development of independent regional and national ETSs allows each system 
to adjust various components of their ETSs in order to fit the region specific 
situation. Linking these independent systems by allowing permits to trade freely 
among ETSs is being considered to potentially increase the effectiveness of 
reducing GHG emissions and increase the odds that emissions reductions will 
occur where the cost is the lowest. There may be the potential to create a set of 
coordinated ETSs to avoid climate change if enough independent systems are 
linked. The next chapter will describe the types of linkages as well as the benefits 
and challenges associated with linking ETSs. 
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CHAPTER III: LINKING EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS 
 
When the UNFCCC created the Kyoto Protocol, some analysts imagined an 
international emissions trading system designed from the ‘top-down,’ where a 
majority of global GHG emissions would be covered by one system for trading 
carbon permits (Hovi, Sprinz, & Underdal, 2014). Since Kyoto, some 
professionals consider the top-down approach to be unworkable (Hovi, Sprinz, & 
Underdal, 2014). More nations seem to be moving towards a ‘bottom-up’ design 
where each nation or trading bloc creates its own ETS according to its own 
unique economic situation (Hovi, Sprinz, & Underdal, 2014). When national or 
regional ETSs are developed, they could potentially connect or link, by allowing 
permits to trade freely among ETSs. Table 5 lists some of the definitions used to 
describe linked ETSs.  
Table 5. Linking ETSs - Definitions  
Allocation 
 
The process in which the total amount of emissions permits allowed 
within the ETS are distributed to the covered entities (Yamin, 2005) 
Emission 
Reduction Goals 
Predetermined targets for lower GHG emissions that ETSs are designed 
to help achieve 
Monitoring, 
Reporting and 
Verification (MRV)  
The process that ensures that permanent emissions reductions are 
actually occurring through an emissions reduction project 
Noncompliance 
 
Noncompliance is when an entity fails to fulfill emission reduction 
requirements (Michaelowa & Koch, 2001). In which case, a penalty is 
usually assigned in addition to the added burden of having to submit the 
missing permits during the following year (Jegou & Rubini, 2011) 
Offsets 
 
A reduction of GHG emissions typically made offsite where reducing 
emissions is cheaper 
Phases A predetermined set of time that an ETS sets specific deadlines and 
requirements for compliance. Splitting an ETS into phases allows any 
necessary adjustments to be made to the system 
Registries 
 
Digital registries of credits that are set up to track the allocation and 
trading of permits (Brokers Carbon, 2011) 
Soft Cap 
 
When an ETS has a soft cap, it does not have limits on all the permits or 
offsets eligible for compliance 
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The system of GHG reduction may become a set of coordinated ETSs to avoid 
climate change. Some political leaders may wait for the outcomes of the Paris 
2015 COP meeting to determine if the UNFCCC can be successful in creating an 
effective binding treaty. Other leaders are more proactive designing their national 
ETSs in a form that can be linked to other ETSs as linking becomes feasible, as 
discussed below.  
 
Linking ETSs has considerable benefits as listed in Table 6. Linking ETSs can 
stabilize prices by increasing the size of the market, increase economic and cost 
efficiency, and reduce the risk of carbon leakage (Jegou & Hawkins, 2014), at 
reduced costs. When the available abatement opportunities are increased 
through linking, the emission reductions can take place where the cost is the 
lowest, thereby increasing the ETS effectiveness (Mehling & Haites, 2009). Table 
6 gives a brief overview of the benefits and risks associated with linking ETSs. 
 
Table 6. Overview of the Benefits and Risks of Linking ETSs 
Benefits of Linkage Risks from Linkage 
- Emissions reductions can occur in more 
places with larger, linked systems. This can 
increase the odds that emission reductions will 
occur where the cost is the lowest 
- Each governing body of an ETS will have to 
give up full control over their ETS because 
policy decisions made in one ETS will affect 
the prices of permits in every ETS linked to it 
- Enough systems could potentially link in order 
to create a global system that will reduce 
enough GHGs to avoid climate change  
- If permits are found to be invalid in an ETS, 
the invalid permits could spread to other linked 
systems making them more difficult to remove 
- Permit prices can be stabilized through linking 
by increasing the size of the market 
- Linkages could cause undesirable changes in 
the price of permits 
- The risk of carbon leakage is reduced in 
larger, coordinated systems 
- Any restrictions on permits in an ETS can be 
undermined if a linked system does not have 
the same restrictions  
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Types of ETS Linkages 
 
Emissions trading systems can be linked, either directly or indirectly. A direct 
linkage means that permits can be traded freely from one system to another. An 
indirect linkage occurs when a permit from one ETS is transferred through a 
second to a third, but the first ETS has no contact with the third. Even though the 
first and the third ETS do not trade directly, permits can move among the 
markets. 
 
Linkages can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. A unilateral ETS exist when 
one nation allows credits issued by a second, but the second does not allow 
credits issued from the first. Bilateral or multilateral linkages are when two or 
more ETSs allow exchange of permits from other systems (Jaffe & Stavins, 
2008). 
 
ETS Design Considerations and Potential Barriers to Linkages 
 
While linking doesn’t require complete harmonization across ETSs, certain ETS 
rules are more likely than others to cause linkage issues. Important 
considerations include the assurance of the emissions reductions, registries 
used, phases, allocation methods, emission reduction goals, penalties for non-
compliance and offsets.  
MONITORING, REPORTING AND VERIFICATION  
 
Policy leaders attempting to link ETSs may want to assure that emission 
reduction permits represent actual GHG reductions through the quality of 
 
 
 62 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV). Strict MRV procedures enhance 
transparency that emissions reductions occur and the ETS is reducing emissions. 
The accuracy of MRV can affect the compatibility of linked systems (Mehling & 
Haites, 2009). Procedures for MRV can differ among ETSs. 
SEPARATE REGISTRIES  
 
Separate ETS registries can be a barrier to linkage if the buyers are unable to set 
up new accounts in foreign registries. There are no physical items being 
exchanged during emissions trading, as emissions permits exist as electronic 
data in registries. The registries for emissions permits are usually specific to 
individual systems. A new account must be created in an ETS registry if a foreign 
buyer wants access that system’s permits (Mehling & Haites, 2009). This could 
become a barrier if foreign accounts are not allowed in a registry. This issue can 
usually be solved by electronically linking the registries of different ETSs so that 
permits can be transferred without the need for new accounts (Jegou & Hawkins, 
2014).  
PHASES 
 
Differences in the timing of permit purchases may not pose a barrier to linkage 
and may actually prove to be helpful. Requiring different submission dates for 
permits can increase the liquidity of the markets and reduce market distortions 
that could occur if all permits requests are due at the same time (Jegou & 
Hawkins, 2014). 
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ALLOCATION METHODS 
 
Allocation methods should not affect the permit prices if permits can trade freely 
through supply and demand after an initial allocation, assuming the market for 
permits functions as planned. Allocation methods might increase political issues 
with linking, as it will affect the initial wealth transfer if one ETS awards credits for 
free while another auctions credits (Jegou & Hawkins, 2014). 
EMISSION REDUCTION GOALS  
 
Differing intensities of emission reduction goals could affect trading. If a national 
ETS has a more intense goal for emission reductions than another, there could 
be an uneven demand for credits amongst the systems. The ETS with more 
intense goals will have an incentive to purchase credits from the system with less 
intense goals where the prices could be lower. This could create capital flows as 
prices converge and balance. This could cause political concerns but will not 
necessarily affect the functionality of the system (Wilde et al, 2009). 
NONCOMPLIANCE  
 
If penalties for noncompliance are low, some firms may not comply and just pay 
the noncompliance penalty rather than reduce GHGs. The price of all the 
connected credits could be affected if one ETS has low noncompliance penalties 
(Jegou & Hawkins, 2014). 
OFFSETS  
 
If offset projects do not exist in one ETS but are allowed in another, the ETS 
without offsets will still have access to the offset permits through the linked 
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system (Jegou & Hawkins, 2014). This could be a barrier to linkage if the ETSs 
accept and restrict different types of offsets. 
 
Risks of Linking 
 
Linking ETSs can have drawbacks. Changes or developments in an ETS can 
have repercussions in every system to which it is linked (Mehling & Haites, 
2009). Linkages could affect the prices of permits, enable unreliable permits, and 
reduce regulatory control of the ETS governing bodies.  
 
Linkages could change permit prices. When ETSs are linked, permit prices will 
be equalized. Prices of permits could go down for some participants while going 
up for others. Price adjustments will affect the costs of energy, energy-intensive 
goods, and products that have emission-intensive manufacturing processes such 
as cement (Jegou & Hawkins, 2014). The overall operating costs of covered 
entities will be affected by the price adjustments. This equalization of permit 
prices could create opposing opinions on linkages (Jaffe & Stavins, 2008). Any 
negative price event in one market can spread to every market to which it is 
connected (World Bank, 2014).  
 
Linking could enable unreliable permits. Mistakes in MRV procedure could create 
unreliable permits that don’t represent real emissions reductions. Unreliable 
permits will be difficult to track if they have been traded through linked systems. 
Tracking the unreliable permits could become more complicated as more ETSs 
are linked.   
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Linkages can reduce national control over an ETS. Policy decisions made in one 
ETS will affect the price of permits in the other. Reduced national control over an 
ETS could cause geopolitical concerns especially if the price of emission permits 
influences economic output. The reduced national control is dependent on the 
type of linkage and size of the systems (Jaffe & Stavins, 2008).  
RISKS OF LINKAGE EXAMPLE - NEW ZEALAND ETS  
 
An example of the risks of linking ETSs is the linkage between the New Zealand 
Emissions Trading System (NZETS) and the Kyoto Protocol. The NZETS was 
designed with a soft cap that allowed covered entities to use unlimited 
international offset credits to meet emission reduction requirements. Most 
covered entities in the NZETS chose to buy inexpensive international Kyoto 
credits (CERs and ERUs) as opposed to New Zealand credits (NZUs) or 
reducing emissions locally. As a result, the NZETS had little effect on reducing 
domestic emissions.  
 
Figure 12 illustrates the price coupling of the NZUs and the Kyoto Credits, 
international permit prices linked with the NZ credits and lowered the price of the 
NZ credits dramatically from late 2011 to 2013.  In November of 2012, New 
Zealand did not sign up for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
to decouple the NZU prices from the Kyoto credit prices. Figure 12 illustrates that 
the price of the NZUs did not improve until the revision of the soft cap in late 
2013 that limited the use of international credits to 50 percent (World Bank, 
2014). This example shows how linking systems could affect the price of permits.   
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Figure 12. Price Coupling of New Zealand Credits and International Credits 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2014): State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014.  Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Retrieved from http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/27/000456286_20140527095323/Rendered/PDF/882840AR0R
EPLA00EPI2102680Box385232.pdf
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Independent systems considering linkages can potentially be affected by the 
development of other ETSs. China has the highest net GHG emissions in the 
world and has taken steps towards measuring and controlling GHG emissions by 
announcing the intention to develop a national ETS. China’s ETS has the 
potential to affect the international stage for developing and existing ETSs 
especially if linking is considered. The next chapter outlines China’s ETS 
development, design and potential global effect. 
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CHAPTER IV: CHINA 
The bulk of the information in this chapter regarding the specific design details of 
China’s regional ETS pilot programs has been retrieved from Swartz, J (2013) A 
User's Guide to Emissions Trading in China: 1st Edition - International Emissions 
Trading Association (IETA). 
Air Pollution in China 
 
Air pollution is a growing concern in China. The pattern of rising economic 
growth, energy consumption and accompanying GHG emissions has led to 
international concerns over the state’s contribution towards climate change. The 
risks to development caused by local and GHG pollution has prompted China to 
initiate a “War on Pollution” (Blanchard & Stanway, 2014). China has 
implemented a regional pilot ETS program that may be followed by a national 
ETS. Both the national and pilot ETS programs can affect ETSs as a policy 
mechanism, UNFCCC negotiations, and existing and future global ETSs.  
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
China's economy is growing quickly and has positioned the country as a 
prominent actor in the global economy. The country went from the 10th largest 
economy in the world in 1990 to the 2nd largest in 2013 (Beach, 2014). China’s 
annual GDP growth rate in the past decade has been around 10.5 percent 
(Walker, 2011). China is also now a member of the WTO and has the world’s 
largest international trade value calculated at $3.87 trillion in 2012 (White, 2013).  
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ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
 
Increases in energy consumption have accompanied the state’s economic 
growth. Figure 13 illustrates a continuous growth in energy consumption. In the 
decade between 2000 and 2010 China’s consumption of energy more than 
doubled from around 1 billion tons of oil equivalent to nearly 2.5 billion tons of oil 
equivalent. China was the world’s largest energy consumer in 2010 with most of 
the energy coming from fossil fuels, especially coal (Swartz & Oster, 2010).  
Figure 13. China’s Energy Consumption By Source 
 
 
 
Source: Beach, Fred (2014): Energy & China. Energy Technology and Policy, UT Energy 
Symposium. Austin, Texas 
 
Most of China’s energy capacity is from the use of coal. In 2011, coal made up 
about 65 percent of China's energy capacity (Beach, 2014). In 2012 China 
consumed 4 billion short tons, around half of the world total coal (EIA, 2013). 
Figure 14 shows that the use of coal in China has tripled in the past decade from 
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1,250 to 3,750 million short tons per year. China’s rail capacity has been unable 
to keep up with the rising coal demand, which has created high transportation 
costs for coal. The high transportation costs for coal have created an economic 
incentive for imported coal as seen in the increasing net imports in Figure 14 
(EIA, 2013).  
Figure 14. China’s Coal Production and Consumption (in millions of tons) 
2000-2011 
 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2013): International Energy Statistics 
Analysis Brief: China. Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf 
 
The consumption of other fossil fuels has also increased in China. China has 
become the largest automobile market in the world. This has added to increases 
in petroleum consumption. China’s petroleum use grew from 2,250 to 10,000 
barrels per day between 1991 and 2012 (Beach, 2014). Natural gas use, 
production and importation are growing in China. There also remains a large 
quantity of domestic shale gas that has yet to be exploited which could lead to 
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increases in domestic gas production (Beach, 2014). These increases in fossil 
fuel energy consumption have resulted in high levels of pollution. 
LOCAL AIR POLLUTION  
 
China’s increasing fossil fuel use has led to localized pollution concerns. Chinese 
officials declared that in 2013 over 95 percent of Chinese cities failed to meet 
environmental standards. Out of the 74 cities monitored, 71 had environmental 
issues (Stanway, 2014). Figure 15 illustrates the daily average small pollutant 
particles per cubic meter of air (known as PM2.5) in China, compared to the most 
polluted US cities. Xingtai is considered the most polluted city in China with over 
155.2 micrograms of PM2.5 pollution per cubic meter, where Bakersfield, 
California (the most polluted city in the US) shows 18.2 micrograms of PM2.5 per 
cubic meter (Denyer, 2014). In major cities, this pollution can cast a visible layer 
of smog over the city in certain weather conditions (Turner & Ellis, 2007). 
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Figure 15. Daily Average Pollution of Chinese and US Cities 
 
Sources: Denyer, S. (2014). In China's War on Bad Air, Government Decision to Release Data 
Gives Fresh Hope. The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-chinas-war-on-bad-air-government-decision-to-release-
data-gives-freshhope/2014/02/02/5e50c872-8745-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html 
 
GHG EMISSIONS 
 
China now emits more GHGs in weight than any other nation. The country 
emitted 22.3 percent of the world’s total GHG emissions in 2011, or 7.6 tCO2e 
per capita (WRI, 2015). China’s population of 1.4 billion inhabitants adds more 
GHGs into the atmosphere than the US’s 19.7 tCO2e per capita emissions (WRI, 
2015). This level of emissions has not only prompted concerns from the 
international community but is now receiving attention from Chinese political 
leaders. 
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RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT 
 
Increases in both localized pollution and GHG pollution are creating risks to 
China’s continued development. Increased levels of localized pollution can 
reduce agricultural yields if plant growth is impeded from pollutants affecting 
photosynthesis. Agricultural areas are already stressed in China. The country 
feeds more than 20 percent of the world’s population with only 7 percent of the 
world’s arable land (Lewis, 2009). Increased storm surges and sea level rise 
caused by climate change may create a direct threat to China’s economy, as the 
majority of China’s population is located along the coastline (Lewis, 2009). 
Drought and flooding resulting from a changing climate are other risks to China’s 
resources. China’s potential resource strains can create international concern. 
Resource problems in China could affect other nation’s resources as China’s 
global influence spreads to supply and support its large population (Lewis, 2009).  
WAR ON POLLUTION 
 
Chinese officials have stated that local air pollution has been “harming people’s 
health and affecting social harmony and stability” (Kashi, 2013). To address the 
public’s concern, officials have declared a “war on pollution” and have enacted a 
variety of measures aimed at mitigating local pollution (Stanway & Chen, 2014). 
In September 2013, the Chinese State Council released its Action Plan for Air 
Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean Air Asia, n.d.). The Plan aims to improve 
air quality by reducing small pollutant particles that cause the most damage to 
human health (Hamlin et al, 2014). As part of the Action Plan, officials have 
implemented policies to reduce the amount of coal in the energy mix, prohibit 
coal that doesn’t meet quality standards (Wadhams, 2014) and restrict annual 
coal consumption to below 4.2 billion metric tons until 2020 (Bo, 2014). Other 
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policies restrict the use of high emission cars (Hamlin et al, 2014) and aim to 
increase the total primary energy share of non-fossil fuels from 9.8 percent in 
2013 to 15 percent by 2020 (Bo, 2014).  
 
Policies designed to improve air quality can have the added benefit of limiting 
GHG emissions. China has implemented policies to reduce GHG emissions to 
capitalize on the GHG reductions from the restrictions on local pollution. China 
has implemented carbon and energy intensity targets. These targets measure the 
amount of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP or energy use per unit of GDP (WRI, 
2007). In 2009, China committed to a target reduction of carbon intensity to 45 
percent below 2005 levels by 2020 (Stanway & Chen, 2014). These intensity 
targets can be less controversial than absolute targets because they are viewed 
as still allowing economic growth but the emissions reductions are less 
predictable than with absolute targets (Han et al, 2012). While the intensity 
targets have been effective in their goals of reducing intensity, overall emissions 
have increased. Since the implementation of intensity targets, the absolute 
emissions of China have still increased by 125 percent (Stanway & Chen, 2014). 
China has moved towards developing emissions trading systems that could 
reduce the absolute level of emissions. 
 
Chinese ETS - Design 
NATIONAL ETS 
 
China has taken steps towards implementing a national ETS to measure and 
control GHG emissions. China initially applied for and received funds from the 
World Bank to help develop a national ETS. The World Bank Program 
Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) is designed to support capacity building 
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to help nations mitigate the effects of climate change. Participating countries 
receive funds after submitting a "Market Readiness Proposal" (MRP). China 
submitted its MRP to the World Bank and was awarded $8 million to begin 
research on a national emissions trading system (Swartz, 2013). When China’s 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) released the 12th 
national five-year plan for the years 2011-2015, the plan outlined the intention to 
create a national ETS (Lo, 2013). The national Chinese ETS is due to start from 
January 2016 with three phases running up to 2025 (World Bank, 2014). The 
ETS will likely cover between 3 and 4 billion tons of CO2 by 2020 and be worth 
more than $70 billion (Hope, 2014). China’s ETS would dwarf the EU ETS in 
size, with nearly 20,000 Chinese covered enterprises (Hope, 2014). 
REGIONAL PILOT ETS PROGRAMS 
 
China’s NDRC has created seven regional pilot ETS programs since 2013 to 
prepare for the national ETS. Each of the pilot programs was designed with 
unique characteristics for policy makers to better understand which practices 
work best for emissions trading in Chinese business and industry (Hope, 2014). 
Each regional ETS focuses on a large city in the Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, 
Guangdong, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Hubei, and Chongqing regions. Figure 16 shows 
the areas covered by each regional system and the close proximity to the Korean 
and Japanese ETSs. By April 2014, six of the eight pilot systems started trading. 
 
The pilot programs cover a significant amount of emissions. Combined the six 
systems covered 1,115 MtCO2e in 2013 making the pilot system program the 
second largest carbon market in the world behind the EUETS (Hope, 2014). 
Collectively, the pilot programs cover 27.4 percent of China’s national GDP and 
18.4 percent of its population (Lo, 2013). Guangdong is the largest of the six 
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regional programs and covered 388 MtCO2e in 2013, which is about equal to all 
of France’s GHG emissions in 2012 (Lo, 2013). Below is a brief overview of the 
regional pilot ETSs. Table 7 summarizes the pilot program’s coverage and 
allocation that will be discussed below. Table 8 in the appendix lists key regional 
pilot program facts.  
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Figure 16. Chinese Regional Pilot Emissions Trading Systems  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2014): State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014.  Washington, DC: World 
Bank Group. Retrieved from http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/27/000456286_20140
527095323/Rendered/PDF/882840AR0REPLA00EPI2102680Box385232.pdf 
 
 
 
 78 
Table 7. Chinese Pilot Program Coverage and Allocation 
 Beijing Shanghai Hangzhou Guangdong 
Entities Covered 435 197 To be specified 827 
Coverage 
Threshold 
>10k tons CO2/yr 
average from 2009 – 
2011 
-Industry > 20k tons 
CO2/yr 
-Non-industry >10k 
tons CO2/yr 
Industries that 
consume >3k tons of 
coal /yr 
> 20k tons of CO2 in 
any year from 2011-
2014 
Allocation 
Free allocation during 
pilot stage then adjusted 
according to the previous 
year’s emissions 
Free allocation but 
auctions could take 
place 
To be specified Free allocation and purchasing of permits 
     
 Shenzen Tianjin Hubei Chongqing 
Entities Covered 625 130 153 300 
Coverage 
Threshold   >5k tons of CO2/yr 
 >20k tons of CO2/yr 
in any year since 
2009 
 
>60k tons of coal/yr 
(first stage) then 
individual enterprises 
>8k tons of coal/yr 
>20k tons of /CO2 per 
year 
Allocation To be specified To be specified 
Free allocations but 
auctioning is 
considered 
To be specified 
 
Information Complied From: Swartz, J., & Chen P., (2013). A User's Guide to Emissions Trading in China: 1st Edition. International 
Emissions Trading Association (IETA). Retrieved from http://www.ieta.org/a-user-guide-to-emissions-trading-in-china--september-2013 
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BEIJING 
 
In spring of 2012, the draft rules for the Beijing ETS pilot program were released. 
The Beijing pilot system covers 50 percent of the total GHG emissions in Beijing. 
The system is mandatory for at least 435 companies but voluntary participation 
has encouraged more to join (Swartz, 2013). The system covers direct CO2 
emissions from electricity generation and heating entities that released an 
average of over 10,000 tons of CO2 from 2009-2011 (Swartz, 2013).  
Manufacturing processes and public buildings will also be held accountable for 
any indirect emissions. Permits are allocated free of charge for the initial phases 
of the pilot program and will be adjusted continually according to the previous 
year's emissions. The pilot program requires that third party companies and 
individuals must verify the emission reductions. Qualified verifiers will be 
registered with the Beijing government.  
 
The Beijing system also includes a "Major Emitters Alliance" which is a group of 
corporations that are required by law to be covered by the ETS (Swartz, 2013). 
The alliance will work with the government on providing suggestions on policy for 
future implementation of the ETS. A financial organization alliance is also being 
developed as a way for Chinese banks to understand how to provide financial 
services to entities covered under the pilot system. Another alliance between 
foreign consulting agencies and third party verifiers will help with policy 
suggestions and also provide consulting services to the ETS’s participants 
(Swartz, 2013).  
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SHANGHAI 
 
The Shanghai system will include any industry that emits more than 20,000 tons 
of CO2 a year and any non-industry entity that emits more than 10,000 tons a 
year (Swartz, 2013). Non-industry includes aviation, ports, airports, railways, 
commercial enterprises, hotels and financial institutions; 197 entities are currently 
covered under these specifications (Swartz, 2013). The Shanghai Environment 
Energy Exchange will establish all trades, auctions, contracts and transaction 
fees. The covered entities are allowed to bank unused allowances for future use. 
The allowances will be issued based on industry specific growth expectations; 
this contrasts with most ETSs that have declining absolute caps on emissions. 
These allowances will be allocated for free but auctions could take place if 
needed (Swartz, 2013).  
HANGZHOU 
 
Few details are known about the Hangzhou system. There is an energy intensity 
reduction target of 19.5 percent. The system has been designed around high-
energy industries that consume over 3,000 tons of coal annually. There are 865 
firms currently covered under these thresholds. If a firm shuts down, the 
Economic Information Commission can buy back extra allowances (Swartz, 
2013). 
GUANGDONG 
 
The Guangdong system will cover both direct and indirect emissions from 
industries within the region that have annually emitted more than 20,000 tons of 
CO2 in any year from 2011-2014. The baselines are determined from any year 
that an entity emits over 20,000 tons of CO2 per year so the years 2011, 2012, 
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2013 or 2014 could be used. The direct emissions covered include emissions 
from both fuel combustion and production while indirect emissions can be from 
purchased electricity and heating. The Guangdong system is unique in the sense 
that it covers transportation and buildings. Any entity that releases over 10,000 
tons of CO2 is required to report emissions. Under these requirements there are 
827 firms listed in the Guangdong region therefore making the system cover the 
most amount of firms.  The allocation methods include both free allocation and 
the purchasing of permits while auctioning is being considered (Swartz, 2013).  
SHENZEN 
 
The Shenzen system was designed around a 21 percent carbon intensity target. 
The emissions threshold to be eligible for the system is 5,000 tons of CO2 per 
year. This low threshold covers 625 entities from 26 sectors making it the second 
most populated system behind Guangdong. Any Chinese or international 
financial institution can apply and register as a member of the Shenzen system. 
The Shenzhen Development and Reform Commission (Shenzhen DRC) will 
administer the ETS and also promote training and education on carbon 
management in order to increase efficient participation in the system (Swartz, 
2013).  
TIANJIN 
 
The Tianjin system has a target of a 17 percent carbon intensity reduction. The 
target aims to lower emissions to 1.69 tons of CO2 emission per RMB 10,000 
GDP. The system has an emissions threshold similar to the Guangdong program 
in the sense that entities are covered if they release more than 20,000 tons of 
CO2 per year in any year since 2009. Covered entities will be limited to industries 
within the municipality. While this only includes 130 companies, the covered 
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companies emit 60 percent of the city’s emissions (Swartz, 2013).  
HUBEI 
 
The Hubei system has a target of reducing carbon intensity by 17 percent by 
2014. The emissions threshold has two stages. The first stage covers sectors 
that use over 60,000 tons of coal/yr and the second stage covers individual 
enterprises that use over 8,000 tons of coal/yr. Under these specifications 153 
entities are currently covered. Allowances will be issued free of charge while 
auctioning is being considered. Futures transactions and banking/borrowing will 
not be allowed (Swartz, 2013).   
CHONGQING 
 
The Chongqing system has a target of increasing forestry coverage from 39 
percent to 45 percent in addition to carbon intensity and energy consumption 
targets. The system will cover entities that release over 20,000 tons of CO2 per 
year, or 300 entities currently covered under these specifications. The system will 
cover 6 sectors of the region’s industrial economy; petrochemical and power 
sectors are not currently covered. The covered emissions are expected to make 
up 35-45 percent of total emissions (Swartz, 2013).  
 
Figure 17 gives a brief overview of the start dates and overall size of most of the 
regional ETSs. The figure shows the vast differences in the coverage of each 
ETS, ranging from 33Mt in Shenzen to 388Mt in Guangdong. The Shenzen was 
the first pilot program and started in June 2013. The program has the largest 
number of participants but covers the lowest total amount of GHG emissions at 
33Mt. Four pilot programs started in late 2013: Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong 
and Tianjin. Figure 17 illustrates that the amount of emissions covered in these 
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four programs range from 50Mt in Beijing to 388Mt in Guangdong. In early April 
2014 the Hubei program opened with a coverage comparable to the Guandong 
system of 324Mt of emissions.  
Figure 17. Characteristics of the Chinese ETS Pilots in Operation 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2014): State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014.  Washington, DC: World 
Bank Group. Retrieved from http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/27/000456286_20140
527095323/Rendered/PDF/882840AR0REPLA00EPI2102680Box385232.pdf 
 
INITIAL RESULTS OF PILOT PROGRAMS 
 
Overall the pilot programs have made progress in introducing emissions trading 
to Chinese companies. In May 2014, the deputy head of the NDRC announced 
that the Chinese pilot programs had traded over 3.85 million credits at a price of 
over $20 million, making China’s pilot programs the second largest carbon 
market after the EUETS (D’Amato, 2014). Despite the size of the market, trading 
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volumes are still relatively low as covered entities are still getting accommodated 
with emissions trading (Wilkening & Kachi, 2014).  
 
There have been reports of some complications with the pilot programs. Chinese 
companies are still learning how to participate, comply with and benefit from 
emissions trading (Wilkening & Kachi, 2014). Some covered entities have 
reported they are unable to afford purchasing permits (Nelson, 2014). Other 
entities have refused to purchase permits and have instead opted to pay the 
noncompliance fines (Nelson, 2014). There has also been price volatility, 
especially in the Shenzhen and Tianjin ETSs, but the prices have since stabilized 
(Nelson, 2014). The different structures of the pilot programs have also led to 
large spread in allowance prices across different programs (Nelson, 2014). 
Prices of permits have ranged from about $20/tCO2 in Shenzhen to less than 
$3/tCO2 in Hubei (D’Amato, 2014).  
NATIONAL ETS IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
 
There could be challenges associated with transitioning the pilot programs to a 
national ETS. The pilot programs were created with different features in order to 
test what design for emissions trading works best with Chinese businesses. This 
approach has created diversified pilot programs that have been designed through 
different approaches. The pilot programs cover a wide range of differences in 
economic structures, growth rates, energy consumption and carbon intensities 
(Han et al, 2012). The pilot programs’ design features will have to be 
consolidated in order to create common elements in some areas to allow a 
functioning ETS (Song & Lei, 2014). Uncertainties remain over the consolidation 
of various components of the pilot programs including emission rights, allocation 
 
 
 85 
procedures, trading rules, MRV, penalties for noncompliance and transparency 
(Gonzalez, 2014).  
 
Creating a comprehensive legal framework for the national system will be 
necessary but can be a challenge to develop. A legal infrastructure has yet to be 
developed that can be the foundation of consolidating the pilot systems’ 
components in order to create an efficient national ETS (Song & Lei, 2014). The 
NDRC has been progressing in this development by drafting a national Climate 
Change Law that will ensure standards for emissions reductions. Standards can 
insure the consistency of emissions reductions so they can be traded through 
exchanges and registries (Song & Lei, 2014). A legal infrastructure can also help 
create a system for MRV that will allow third parties to verify the accuracy of 
emission reductions. Penalties for non-compliance can be enforced through a 
legal system (Gonzalez, 2014). Transparency requirements can also be created 
through a legal system to ensure reliable emissions data from which baselines 
and targets can be determined (Han et al, 2012). 
 
Capacity building can be another hurdle for transitioning the pilot programs into a 
national system. The Chinese government sets commodity prices (Song & Lei, 
2014) so the pilot programs have experienced a shortage of professionals who 
are qualified to trade and manage an emissions portfolio (Han et al, 2012). 
External consultants and training could be necessary to make sure Chinese staff 
can operate and oversee the national ETS (Song & Lei, 2014).  
 
China’s pilot programs focus on ensuring necessary ETS mechanics including 
price-discovery, trading and allocation rules, registries and trading platforms all 
while taking into account the lessons from other nation’s failures and successes 
(Huang, 2013). The current national ETS rules are remaining flexible so pilot 
 
 
 86 
programs can test differing rules in varying regions and environments. The 
entities are being encouraged to develop local solutions to trading requirements 
in order to showcase the most effective solutions in each environment. The 
positive results from the pilot systems could be reflected in the national ETS 
requirements. Even though China’s ETS is still in the pilot stage and there are 
still unresolved challenges with transitioning into a national ETS, the program can 
still have significant effects on the perception of an ETS as a policy mechanism, 
the UNFCCC negotiations and the development of other ETSs. 
 
Chinese ETS - Global Effect 
ETS AS A POLICY MECHANISM  
 
China’s choice of an ETS, as opposed to a tax or direct regulation, shows 
China’s confidence in an ETS’s ability to support economic growth and control 
emissions. The assumed least cost-occurrence of emission reductions and the 
motivation for innovation and investment in low-carbon technologies could make 
the policy more economically attractive than other GHG reduction strategies. An 
ETS can support options for continued economic growth. If a domestic offset 
mechanism is developed, economic growth could be promoted by focusing on 
domestic projects not covered by the ETS. The offset program could be inspired 
by UN programs such as the Joint Implementation program to target 
underdeveloped regions in China. This would encourage capital and technology 
transfers in exchange for emission reduction permits. If China’s ETS can 
successfully reduce emissions without impeding economic growth, other nations 
will look more favorably towards an ETS over other GHG reduction mechanisms. 
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UNFCCC NEGOTIATIONS 
 
The relatively large amount of GHG emissions covered by the Chinese system 
can influence future UNFCCC negotiations at the upcoming 2015 Conference of 
the Parties 21 in Paris. One of the main criticisms of the Kyoto Protocol was the 
different GHG reduction requirements between developed and developing 
nations. In the original design of the Kyoto Protocol, capital was expected to flow 
from developed countries to developing countries to assist with the costs needed 
to reduce emissions. This design was undesirable for developed countries 
because there were financial advantages for developing nations. With China’s 
announcement of a self-imposed ETS, developed countries could have difficulty 
arguing that developing countries are not regulating emissions as strongly as the 
developed nations. Some developed nations might accept the idea that the 
playing field is even enough to accept and promote UNFCCC efforts to mitigate 
climate change. 
EFFECTS ON OTHER SYSTEMS 
A Chinese national system has the potential to affect the development of existing 
and future ETSs around the world, especially if linkages are considered. The 
largest incremental growth of future GHGs is expected to come from the 
developing countries of Asia (Massetti & Tavoni, 2012). An international pledge 
to reduce global emissions by 50 percent in 2050 assumes a 70-80 percent 
reduction in Asian emissions based off of projected business as usual scenarios 
(Massetti & Tavoni, 2012). China has the potential to be the center of an 
Asian/Pacific carbon-trading network to help reduce these emissions. This 
network could consist of China as the leader of national ETSs acting similarly to 
the EU and its surrounding nations (Lo, 2013) or to Western Climate Initiative’s 
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linkages across North America. The close location to other systems such as New 
Zealand, South Korea and other more localized systems in the area such as 
Tokyo could be an incentive for linking to existing systems. The potential for 
technology transfer and capital flows could encourage lower income South Asian 
nations and small island states in the Pacific region to link with China’s ETS, 
especially if China’s ETS includes an international offset mechanism similar to 
the UN’s CDM or Japan’s JCM. This potential Asian region of linkages could 
have the potential to create a market area to rival the dominant European ETS. 
There could be conflicting opinions on linking ETSs with China from the 
perspective of foreign governments. Linking systems could be encouraged by 
many ETSs experiencing low permit prices. A higher permit price is still needed 
in the EUETS to encourage emission reductions. China’s national ETS could be 
the needed linkage partner for the EUETS that will raise the prices of EU credits.  
Examples such as the NZETS and EUETS linkage show that a linkage can 
spread a permit price. European entities with few options for low-cost domestic 
emissions reductions could under linkage purchase permits from China if the 
permit prices were lower. On the other hand, nations interested in linking could 
have serious concerns with linking to China’s ETS. Smaller systems could be 
concerned over losing too much control over local prices due to the massive size 
and influence of the Chinese ETS. This situation would be comparable to the 
NZETS and EUETS linkage. The potential lack of transparency in China’s MRV 
could cause concerns for potential linkage partners. If Chinese credits are 
accepted into a foreign system, there is the risk that the credits could later be 
considered unreliable due to low quality information in the MRV process. The 
massive amount of credits in the market could cause irreversible disruptions 
throughout any linked system. Double counting could also be a concern if a lack 
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of transparency in the Chinese systems facilitates a situation where emission 
reductions are counted twice. 
 
Outcomes of the Chinese pilot ETS components such as system coverage, credit 
allocation, registries, penalties for noncompliance, temporal flexibility, and rules 
for new entrants will all affect the future development of the national ETS. Future 
linkage considerations also remain to be specified that could encourage 
international cooperation on emissions trading in order to reduce emissions at the 
least cost. Differences in MRV, registries, trading periods, allocation methods, 
reduction goals, noncompliance issues and offsets will all need to be determined 
before any linkages are considered.   
 
Decisions made by China on climate change mitigation may have the potential to 
affect other nations’ policies toward climate change mitigation. China’s regional 
ETS pilot programs and potential future national ETS can affect the development 
of emissions trading worldwide. The effects of the Chinese ETS remain to be 
seen depending on the results of the pilot program. This thesis concludes with an 
overview of climate change, the global overview of ETSs, linking ETSs and 
China’s ETS. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The rising levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and resulting climate 
change has the potential to affect societies around the world. Reducing GHG 
emissions has become a concern for policy leaders worldwide. One of the most 
effective ways to reduce GHG emissions is to price carbon in order to utilize the 
private sector’s economic power. There are three major tools being used to 
reduce GHG emissions by pricing carbon: policy regulation, taxation, and 
emissions trading. Each tool affects the targeted entities in a different way. 
Emissions trading could in principle enable emission reductions to occur at the 
least cost.  
 
The UNFCCC developed the Kyoto protocol as a top-down approach to limit 
GHG emissions through an international ETS. The Kyoto protocol has created 
various ETS flexibility mechanisms that serve as models for other ETSs such as 
International Emissions Trading (IET), the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI). As of 2015, negotiations for further Kyoto 
Protocol implementation are essentially stalled. There are divisions among 
nations involved in the UNFCCC climate negotiations restricting further 
agreements or supplemental implementation plans. The stalled negotiations at 
the UNFCCC are encouraging the exploration of alternative methods to develop 
ETSs. 
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GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF ETSS 
 
The bottom-up development of independent regional and national ETSs is 
increasing. Notable ETSs currently include: the European Union, Korea, New 
Zealand, Kazakhstan, Switzerland, Japan, Tokyo, the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, California AB32, Western Climate Initiative, and Australia’s now 
canceled ETS. These regional systems are being developed independently in 
accordance with each area’s unique requirements. Regional systems can adjust 
the various components of their ETSs in order to fit the region’s specific situation. 
These components include coverage, leakage issues, allocation, registries, 
penalties for non-compliance, temporal flexibility, new entrants, offsets, 
additionality, MRV, permanence, and double counting. 
LINKING ETSS 
 
Many regional and national ETSs are moving towards developing a bottom-up 
design of international emissions trading by linking separate ETSs. Linking 
systems requires each nation or trading bloc to create individual ETSs that link 
together by allowing permits to trade freely among ETSs. Linking individual 
systems expands the market size to theoretically allow emission reductions at 
least-cost. Linking systems presents new challenges and considerations to 
developing an ETS. Components between linked systems that should be 
reviewed include MRV procedures, registries, phases, allocation methods, 
emission reduction goals, non-compliance penalties, and offsets. Linkages risk 
affecting permit prices, enabling unreliable permits, and reducing regulatory 
control of the ETS governing bodies. Linking systems has the potential to 
develop a bottom-up system of interlinked ETSs that cover enough GHG 
emissions to reduce climate change.   
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CHINA 
 
China has been experiencing continuous economic growth accompanied by 
increases in energy consumption. The increasing economic growth and energy 
consumption of China has resulted in high levels of localized pollutants and 
global GHG pollutants. Rising levels of pollution can pose a risk to the continued 
economic development of China. China has taken steps towards measuring and 
controlling local pollution as well as GHG emissions. China has announced the 
intention to develop a national ETS and has created seven regional pilot ETS 
programs in preparation for the national ETS. The pilot programs cover the 
Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Hubei, and 
Chongqing regions. These programs are being developed with various rules and 
regulations to test how emissions trading fits best with Chinese industry. The 
national ETS will be implemented based on the results of the pilot programs but 
significant challenges still remain in transitioning the pilot programs to the 
national ETS. 
 
China’s future national ETS can affect the perception of an ETS as a policy 
mechanism, the UNFCCC negotiations, and the development of existing and 
future ETSs. China’s commitment to economic development and selection of an 
ETS as opposed to other GHG reduction policy mechanisms can raise other 
nations’ confidence in an ETS’s ability to reduce emissions without impeding 
economic growth. The relatively large amount of GHG emissions covered by the 
Chinese system can influence future UNFCCC negotiations. China’s self-
imposed ETS has the potential to affect the international stage for developing 
and existing ETSs. Asia could become the global center for emissions trading. 
The impact of China’s system will be magnified if linking is considered but 
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whether the impacts are positive or negative will depend on the potential linkage 
partners.  
 
The lessons learned from China’s system could serve as a blueprint for the 
continued development of current systems worldwide and the implementation of 
new systems. Whether China’s national ETS is successful or not, the future 
development of emissions trading systems will undoubtedly be influenced by the 
results of China’s ETS. 
 
 
 
. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 8 lists key Chinese regional ETS information on each system’s 
borrowing/banking, MRV, offsets, penalties, registry information, trading 
platforms and linkages. 
Table 8. Chinese Regional ETS Details 
Beijing 
 
Borrowing/Banking: No borrowing but banking is allowed during pilot period. 
Monitoring/Reporting/Verification: Build enterprise emissions inventory. 
Third party verification required to DRC in March. Penalty not specified. 
Offsets: Allow certified project based reductions such as CCER (Chinese 
Certified Emission Reductions). 
Penalties: Not Specified 
Registry: Established by the end of 2012. 
Trading Platform: Beijing Environment Exchange 
Linking: Not Specified 
(Swartz, IETA, 2013)  
Shanghai 
Borrowing/Banking: No borrowing. Banking is allowed during pilot period. 
Monitoring/Reporting/Verification: Emissions audits. Submitted reports are 
verified by 3rd parties. Penalties are not specified 
Offsets: Allow certified project based reductions, such as CCER, limited to 5 
percent of allocation amount. 
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Table 8. (Continued) Chinese Regional ETS Details 
 
Shanghai (Continued) 
 
Registry: Established by the end of 2012 
Trading Platform: Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange 
Linking: Not Specified 
(Swartz, IETA, 2013) 
 
Hangzhou 
 
Borrowing/Banking: To be specified 
Monitoring/Reporting/Verification: No MRV guidelines in place. Energy 
supervision center will monitor energy consumption enterprises. Economic 
Information Commission (EIC) will be in charge of MRV. 
Offsets: To be specified 
 Penalties: To be specified 
Registry: Not Specified 
Trading Platform: Hangzhou Emissions Trading Platform 
Linking: Not Specified 
(Swartz, IETA, 2013)  
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Table 8. (Continued) Chinese Regional ETS Details 
 
Guangdong 
 
Borrowing/Banking: Borrowing is not allowed. Banking allowed with the 
NDRC's permission 
Monitoring/Reporting/Verification: Emissions audits. 3rd party verification 
required. 
Offsets: Allow certified project based reductions such as CCER or credits 
registered in Guangdong. 10 percent CCER limit of registered allowances. 
Penalties: Excessive Emissions: 3x average market price. No permissions on 
new projects and installations 
Registry: Not Specified 
Trading Platform: Guangdong Emission Exchange 
Linking: Plan to link with pilot ETS in Hubei Province 
(Swartz, IETA, 2013):  
Shenzen 
Borrowing/Banking: Banking is allowed during the first trading period (2013 - 
2015) 
Monitoring/Reporting/Verification: MRV guidelines in place 
Offsets: Allow certified project based reductions such as CCER; the available 
amount of CCERs will be limited 
Penalties: Penalty 3x the average market price for the emissions that exceed 
the limit 
Registry: Not Specified 
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Table 8. (Continued) Chinese Regional ETS Details 
 
Shenzen (Continued) 
 
Trading Platform: China Shenzhen Emission Exchange. Only spot, not 
futures. Opening day value of transactions 613,235 Yuan  
Linking: Not Specified.  
(Swartz, IETA, 2013) 
 
Tianjin 
 
Borrowing/Banking: To be decided 
Monitoring/Reporting/Verification: Build enterprise emissions inventory and 
investigation systems. 3rd party verification required 
Offsets: Allow certified project based reductions such as CCER; Enterprises 
are allowed to purchase CCER to fulfill no more than 10 percent of their annual 
CO2  emissions. 
Penalties: To be specified 
Registry: Not Specified 
Trading Platform: Tianjin Climate Exchange 
Linking: Not Specified 
(Swartz, IETA, 2013) 
Hubei 
Borrowing/Banking: Banking and borrowing not allowed 
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Table 8. (Continued) Chinese Regional ETS Details    
  
Hubei (Continued) 
Monitoring/Reporting/Verification: Firms with coal consumption +8000 tons 
per year must complete MRV procedures. 3rd party verification required 
Offsets: Allow certified project based reductions such as CCER (including 
forest carbon sinks). Offset limit 15 percent of allocation 10 percent limit for 
new entrants 
Penalties: Excessive Emissions: 3x average market price 
Registry: Not Specified 
Trading Platform: Wuhan Optics Valley United Property Rights Exchange 
Linking: Plan to link with pilot ETS in Guangdong Province.  
(Swartz, IETA, 2013) 
Chong Qing 
Borrowing/Banking: Not Specified 
Monitoring/Reporting/Verification: Firms with standard coal consumption 
>8,000 tons per year must complete MRV procedures. 3rd Party Verification 
required.  
Offsets: Allow certified project based reductions such as CCER (including 
forest carbon sinks) 
Penalties: Allow certified project based reductions such as CCER (including 
forest carbon sinks) 
Registry: Established by Chongqing DRC 
Trading Platform: Chongqing United Assets and Equity Exchange 
Linking: Not Specified 
(Swartz, IETA, 2013) 
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